Results of the winter war. Russo-Finnish War

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940. The reasons for the start, course and results of the war are still considered very controversial. The instigator of the war was the USSR, whose leadership was interested in territorial acquisitions in the Karelian Isthmus region. Western countries almost did not react to the Soviet-Finnish conflict. France, England and the United States tried to adhere to a position of non-interference in local conflicts, so as not to give Hitler a reason for new territorial seizures. Therefore, Finland was left without the support of its Western allies.

Reason and reasons for the war

The Soviet-Finnish war was provoked by a whole complex of reasons related, first of all, to the protection of the border between the two countries, as well as geopolitical differences.

• During 1918-1922 The Finns attacked the RSFSR twice. To prevent further conflicts, an agreement on the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border was signed in 1922; according to the same document, Finland received Petsamo or the Pecheneg region, the Rybachy Peninsula and part of the Sredny Peninsula. In the 1930s, Finland and the USSR signed a Non-Aggression Pact. At the same time, relations between the states remained tense; the leadership of both countries feared mutual territorial claims.
• Stalin regularly received information that Finland had signed secret agreements on support and assistance with the Baltic countries and Poland if the Soviet Union attacked one of them.
• At the end of the 1930s, Stalin and his circle were also concerned about the rise of Adolf Hitler. Despite the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, many in the USSR feared a military clash and considered it necessary to begin preparations for war. One of the most strategically important cities in the USSR was Leningrad, but the city was too close to the Soviet-Finnish border. In the event that Finland decided to support Germany (and this is exactly what happened), Leningrad would find itself in a very vulnerable position. Shortly before the start of the war, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Finland with a request to exchange part of the Karelian Isthmus for other territories. However, the Finns refused. Firstly, the lands offered in exchange were infertile, and secondly, in the area that interested the USSR, there were important military fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.
• Also, the Finnish side did not give its consent to the Soviet Union leasing several Finnish islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula. The USSR leadership planned to place its military bases in these territories.
• Soon the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland;
• Germany and the USSR signed a secret non-aggression treaty and secret protocols to it, according to which Finnish territory was to fall into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. To some extent, this agreement freed the hands of the Soviet leadership with regard to regulating the situation with Finland

The reason for the start of the Winter War was. On November 26, 1939, the village of Mainila, located on the Karelian Isthmus, was shelled from Finland. The Soviet border guards who were in the village at that time suffered the most from the shelling. Finland denied its involvement in this act and did not want the conflict to develop further. However, the Soviet leadership took advantage of the current situation and declared the start of war.

There is still no evidence confirming the guilt of the Finns in the shelling of Mainila. Although, however, there are no documents indicating the involvement of the Soviet military in the November provocation. The papers provided by both parties cannot be considered as unambiguous evidence of anyone’s guilt. At the end of November, Finland advocated the creation of a general commission to investigate the incident, but the Soviet Union rejected this proposal.

On November 28, the leadership of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact (1932). Two days later, active hostilities began, which went down in history as the Soviet-Finnish war.

In Finland, the mobilization of those liable for military service was carried out; in the Soviet Union, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were brought into full combat readiness. A broad propaganda campaign was launched against the Finns in the Soviet media. In response, Finland began to carry out an anti-Soviet campaign in the press.

From mid-November 1939, the USSR deployed four armies against Finland, which included: 24 divisions (the total number of military personnel reached 425 thousand), 2.3 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand aircraft.

The Finns had only 14 divisions, in which 270 thousand people served, they had 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.

Course of events

The Winter War can be divided into two stages:

• November 1939 - January 1940: the USSR advanced in several directions at once, the fighting was quite fierce;
• February - March 1940: massive shelling of Finnish territory, attack on the Mannerheim Line, Finnish surrender and peace negotiations.

On November 30, 1939, Stalin gave the order to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, and on December 1, Soviet troops captured the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk).

In the occupied territory, the Soviet army established contacts with Otto Kuusinen, who was the head of the Finnish Communist Party and an active participant in the Comintern. With Stalin's support, he proclaimed the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic. Kuusinen became its president and began negotiations with the Soviet Union on behalf of the Finnish people. Official diplomatic relations were established between the FDR and the USSR.

The Soviet 7th Army moved very quickly towards the Mannerheim Line. The first chain of fortifications was broken through in the first ten days of 1939. The Soviet soldiers were unable to advance further. All attempts to break through the next lines of defense ended in losses and defeats. Failures on the line led to the suspension of further advance into the interior of the country.

Another army - the 8th - was advancing in the north of Lake Ladoga. In just a few days, the troops covered 80 kilometers, but were stopped by a lightning attack by the Finns, as a result of which half of the army was destroyed. Finland's success was due, first of all, to the fact that Soviet troops were tied to the roads. The Finns, moving in small mobile units, easily cut off equipment and people from the necessary communications. The 8th Army retreated with casualties, but did not leave the region until the very end of the war.

The most unsuccessful campaign of the Red Army during the Winter War is considered to be the attack on Central Karelia. Stalin sent the 9th Army here, which successfully advanced from the first days of the war. The troops were tasked with capturing the city of Oulu. This was supposed to cut Finland into two parts, demoralize and disorganize the army in the northern regions of the country. Already on December 7, 1939, the soldiers managed to capture the village of Suomussalmi, but the Finns were able to encircle the division. The Red Army switched to a perimeter defense, repelling attacks by Finnish skiers. Finnish detachments carried out their actions suddenly, and the main striking force of the Finns were almost elusive snipers. The clumsy and insufficiently mobile Soviet troops began to suffer enormous human losses, and equipment also broke down. The 44th Infantry Division was sent to help the encircled division, which also found itself surrounded by Finnish forces. Due to the fact that the two divisions were under constant fire, the 163rd Rifle Division gradually began to fight its way back. Almost 30% of the personnel died, more than 90% of the equipment was left to the Finns. The latter almost completely destroyed the 44th division and regained control of the state border in Central Karelia. In this direction, the actions of the Red Army were paralyzed, and the Finnish army received huge trophies. The victory over the enemy raised the morale of the soldiers, but Stalin repressed the leadership of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the Red Army.

In the area of ​​the Rybachy Peninsula, the 14th Army advanced quite successfully. Within a short period of time, the soldiers captured the city of Petsamo with its nickel mines and went straight to the border with Norway. Thus, Finland was cut off from access to the Barents Sea.

In January 1940, the Finns encircled the 54th Infantry Division (in the Suomussalmi area, in the south), but did not have the strength and resources to destroy it. Soviet soldiers were surrounded until March 1940. The same fate awaited the 168th Infantry Division, which tried to advance in the Sortavala area. Also, a Soviet tank division fell into Finnish encirclement near Lemetti-Yuzhny. She managed to escape from the encirclement, losing all her equipment and more than half her soldiers.

The Karelian Isthmus became the zone of the most active military operations. But by the end of December 1939, the fighting here stopped. This was caused by the fact that the leadership of the Red Army began to understand the futility of attacks on the Mannerheim line. The Finns tried to use the lull in the war to maximum advantage and go on the attack. But all operations ended unsuccessfully with huge casualties.

By the end of the first stage of the war, in January 1940, the Red Army was in a difficult situation. She fought in unfamiliar, practically unexplored territory; moving forward was dangerous due to numerous ambushes. In addition, the weather made planning operations difficult. The position of the Finns was also unenviable. They had problems with the number of soldiers and lacked equipment, but the country's population had enormous experience in guerrilla warfare. Such tactics made it possible to attack with small forces, inflicting significant losses on large Soviet detachments.

Second period of the Winter War

Already on February 1, 1940, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Red Army began a massive artillery shelling that lasted 10 days. The purpose of this action was to damage the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops, to exhaust the soldiers, and to break their morale. The actions taken achieved their goals, and on February 11, 1940, the Red Army began an offensive into the interior of the country.

Very fierce fighting began on the Karelian Isthmus. The Red Army first planned to deliver the main blow to the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. But the USSR army began to get stuck on foreign territory, suffering losses. As a result, the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhde. In the area of ​​this settlement, the Finnish defenses were broken through, which allowed the Red Army to pass through the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns began to withdraw their troops.

By the end of February 1940, the Soviet army also crossed Mannerheim’s second line of defense, breaking through it in several places. By the beginning of March, the Finns began to retreat because they were in a difficult situation. Reserves were depleted, the morale of the soldiers was broken. A different situation was observed in the Red Army, the main advantage of which was its huge reserves of equipment, materiel, and replenished personnel. In March 1940, the 7th Army approached Vyborg, where the Finns put up stiff resistance.

On March 13, hostilities ceased, which was initiated by the Finnish side. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

• Vyborg was one of the largest cities in the country, its loss could have a negative impact on the morale of citizens and the economy;
• After the capture of Vyborg, the Red Army could easily reach Helsinki, which threatened Finland with a complete loss of independence and independence.

Peace negotiations began on March 7, 1940 and took place in Moscow. Based on the results of the discussion, the parties decided to cease hostilities. The Soviet Union received all the territories on the Karelian Isthmus and the cities: Salla, Sortavala and Vyborg, located in Lapland. Stalin also achieved that the Hanko Peninsula be given to him on a long-term lease.

• The Red Army lost about 88 thousand people killed, dying from wounds and frostbite. Almost 40 thousand more people were missing, and 160 thousand were injured. Finland lost 26 thousand people killed, 40 thousand Finns were injured;
• The Soviet Union achieved one of its key foreign policy objectives - ensuring the security of Leningrad;
• The USSR strengthened its position on the Baltic coast, which was achieved through the acquisition of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, where Soviet military bases were moved;
• The Red Army gained vast experience in conducting military operations in difficult weather and tactical conditions, learning to break through fortified lines;
• In 1941, Finland supported Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR and allowed German troops through its territory, who managed to establish a blockade of Leningrad;
• The destruction of the Mannerheim Line was fatal for the USSR, since Germany was able to quickly capture Finland and enter the territory of the Soviet Union;
• The war showed Germany that the Red Army was unfit for combat in difficult weather conditions. The same opinion was formed among the leaders of other countries;
• Finland, under the terms of the peace agreement, had to build a railway track, with the help of which it was planned to connect the Kola Peninsula and the Gulf of Bothnia. The road was supposed to pass through the village of Alakurtia and connect with Tornio. But this part of the agreement was never implemented;
• On October 11, 1940, another agreement was signed between the USSR and Finland, which concerned the Åland Islands. The Soviet Union received the right to establish a consulate here, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone;
• The international organization League of Nations, created following the First World War, excluded the Soviet Union from its membership. This was due to the fact that the international community reacted negatively to the USSR intervention in Finland. The reasons for exclusion were also the constant aerial bombing of Finnish civilian targets. Incendiary bombs were often used during raids;

Thus, the Winter War became the reason for Germany and Finland to gradually move closer and interact. The Soviet Union tried to resist such cooperation, restraining the growing influence of Germany and trying to establish a loyal regime in Finland. All this led to the fact that with the outbreak of World War II, the Finns joined the Axis countries in order to free themselves from the USSR and return lost territories.

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Human reserves

By the end of November 1939, Finland concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.

The land army cooperated and was supported by the Finnish Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were added to the army's roster of 337 thousand people as a military force:

Paramilitary formations of Shutskor and Lotta Svyard - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of manpower involved in the war on the part of Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

A 150,000-strong Anglo-French expeditionary force was also being prepared and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - beginning of March 1940 to help Finland, whose arrival only disrupted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed and had everything it needed. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 naval warships.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent it weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, and Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million cartridges.

90% of financial assistance came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavian countries.

B. Fortifications

The basis of Finland's military power was its unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its front, main and rear lines and defense nodes.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bed) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, canals) of Finland in combination with highly technical engineering structures to create a defense line capable of multi-layered fire at the advancing enemy (at different levels and from different angles) along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, rubble, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and ceilings of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. Forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three stripes of the “Mannerheim Line” there were over 1000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

The space between the fortification lines, as well as the forefield in front of the entire “Mannerheim Line”, was literally covered with continuous military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire fences, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete obstacles. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, and all roads were prepared for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were built - craters 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 minutes were set for each linear kilometer. Forest debris reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish war plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the arrival of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega Sea lake

D. Directions of combat operations and command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: on the “Mannerheim Line” itself and in its forefield stood the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Käkisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed commander-in-chief of the active army of Finland.

The Chief of Staff of Headquarters is Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is Swedish Army General Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In combat operations along the entire 1,500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, during the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

Established number of ground forces: 916 thousand people. They consist of: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal troops and engineers.

The ground forces were supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million personnel of the Red Army and Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary reinforcements during the war to replace the killed and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three D-type boats, seven Shch-type boats, six M-type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) Northern and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army commander - corps commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

The commander of the 7th Army is Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and deep-echeloned defense of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not only insufficient to break through them, but even to destroy during combat operations a deep and extremely complex fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they were unable to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally expected, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor complicating the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely harsh winter of 1939/40 with its frosts of up to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in warfare in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's actions.

Progress of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. military operations until the Mannerheim Line was broken.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. military operations to break through the Mannerheim Line itself.

In the first period, the most successful advance was in the north and Karelia.

1. Troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland’s access to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into enemy defenses in Northern and Central Karelia, i.e. insignificantly, but still went beyond the state border. Further advancement could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. Troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia penetrated up to 80 km into enemy territory, but were also forced to pause the offensive because some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well familiar with the terrain.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of military operations:

5. Conducting heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the “Mannerheim Line,” which happened in different sections of the offensive from December 2 to 12. In the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terijoki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet captured the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, and Soomeri.

At the beginning of December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of Corps Commander V.D. Grendal for a breakthrough across the river. Taipalenjoki and reaching the rear of the Mannerheim Line fortifications.

Despite crossing the river and heavy losses in the battles of December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on their success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the “Mannerheim Line” on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers, and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended virtually along the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided to radically restructure military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy’s defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the Mannerheim Line, consisting of a group of corps commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of troop control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from subordination to the Leningrad Military District and came directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (formation date: January 7, 1940).

Front Commander: Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Front Staff: Army Commander 2nd Rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov (from December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Corps Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Corps Commander V.D. Grendal (from March 2, 1940 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Army Commander 2nd Rank M.P. Kovalev (from February 12, 1940).

8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and strengthened:

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period was to actively prepare the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as to prepare the command of the troops for the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the forefield, covertly clear the mines in the forefield, make numerous passages in the rubble and wire fences before directly attacking the fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” itself. Over the course of a month, the “Mannerheim Line” system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began through methodical daily artillery fire.

In a 43-kilometer area alone, the 7th Army fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy every day.

Aviation also caused destruction to the enemy's front line and depth of defense. During preparation for the assault, bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (budyonnovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflap hats, sheepskin coats, and felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aviation.

11. The front troops were given the task: to break through the “Mannerheim Line”, defeat the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Kexholm - Antrea station - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began at 8.00 with a powerful two-hour artillery barrage, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy’s defenses by the end of the day in the decisive sector and by February 14 had wedged 7 km deep into the line, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions of the 123rd Infantry Division. (Lieutenant Colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire “Mannerheim Line”. To build on the success of the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command brought up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important fortification center. But as a result of 3 days of fighting and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karkhul resistance node, while the neighboring Khottinensky node had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanyarvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves junction, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, internal line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that another such breakthrough and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman was suspended. In his place was appointed on February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the rear, internal line of enemy defense, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command hoped that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had a unique system of flooding the forefield for 30 km, Finland would be able to prolong the war for at least a month and a half, which would make it possible for England and France to deliver Finland with a 150,000-strong expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. The chief of the main staff of the Finnish army, Lieutenant General K.L., was appointed commander of the troops of the Vyborg region. Esh, which testified to the Finnish command’s confidence in its abilities and the seriousness of its intentions to hold back the long siege of the fortress city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was supposed to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army attacked Kexholm and Art. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies advanced in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice could still withstand tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The Soviet offensive began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a north-eastern direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 11 p.m., and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At this time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, still hoping that Western help would arrive in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position forced the war to continue until the last minute and led to huge losses on both the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Losses of the parties*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter,
What happened in the forties
Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly
Childishly small body.
The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew far away.
It seemed that the boy was not lying down,
And he was still running,
Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among the great cruel war,
Why - I can’t imagine -
I feel sorry for that distant fate
Like dead, alone,
It's like I'm lying there
Broken, small, killed,
In that unknown war,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of these, 65,384 people were killed.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss of troops during the period of hostilities was 391.8 thousand people. or, in round numbers, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish Blue and White Book of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war was 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called up or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.e. 20%, while Soviet losses amount to 40% of those involved in operations or, in other words, in percentage terms 2 times higher.

Note:

* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and in journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and decrease in Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryagi, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later, - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Pharmacists in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while data from Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

Baryshnikov V.N. From a cool world to a winter war: Finland’s eastern policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state univ. - St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.

Winter War 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ross. acad. Sciences, Institute of General Sciences. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Rep. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehviläinen. - 381s.

["Winter War" 1939-1940]: Selection of materials //Motherland. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons of a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- P. 29-31

Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: according to doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541 p. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Name. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [transl. from English V. D. Kaydalova]. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa: talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla: , 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: pp. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Materials used from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Materials used from the book: Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of ​​Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that accepting Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state and lead to Finland losing its neutrality and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) ran just 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was impossible to fulfill, because then Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30 at 8 a.m., troops of the Leningrad Front received orders to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyösti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During "perestroika" several versions of the Maynila incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret unit of the NKVD. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary evidence.

From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered separate directions from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

The "Mannerheim Line" had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite obstacles up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational obstacles and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing an offensive, enveloped the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, and cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government asking for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.

The losses of Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.

(Additional

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was undergoing intense discussions about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of ​​Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of ​​​​attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. This military conflict was preceded by long negotiations regarding the exchange of territories, which ultimately ended in failure. In the USSR and Russia, this war, for obvious reasons, remains in the shadow of the war with Germany that soon followed, but in Finland it is still the equivalent of our Great Patriotic War.

Although the war remains half-forgotten, no heroic films are made about it, books about it are relatively rare and it is poorly reflected in art (with the exception of the famous song “Accept us, Suomi Beauty”), there is still debate about the causes of this conflict. What did Stalin count on when starting this war? Did he want to Sovietize Finland or even incorporate it into the USSR as a separate union republic, or were his main goals the Karelian Isthmus and the security of Leningrad? Can the war be considered a success or, given the ratio of sides and the scale of losses, a failure?

Background

A propaganda poster from the war and a photo of a Red Army party meeting in the trenches. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In the second half of the 1930s, unusually active diplomatic negotiations took place in pre-war Europe. All major states were feverishly looking for allies, sensing the approach of a new war. The USSR did not stand aside either, which was forced to negotiate with the capitalists, who were considered the main enemies in Marxist dogma. In addition, events in Germany, where the Nazis came to power, an important part of whose ideology was anti-communism, pushed for active action. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Germany had been the main Soviet trading partner since the early 1920s, when both defeated Germany and the USSR found themselves in international isolation, which brought them closer.

In 1935, the USSR and France signed a mutual assistance treaty, clearly directed against Germany. It was planned as part of a more global Eastern Pact, according to which all Eastern European countries, including Germany, were to enter a single system of collective security, which would fix the existing status quo and make aggression against any of the participants impossible. However, the Germans did not want to tie their hands, the Poles also did not agree, so the pact remained only on paper.

In 1939, shortly before the end of the Franco-Soviet treaty, new negotiations began, to which Britain joined. The negotiations took place against the backdrop of aggressive actions by Germany, which had already taken part of Czechoslovakia, annexed Austria and, apparently, did not plan to stop there. The British and French planned to conclude an alliance treaty with the USSR to contain Hitler. At the same time, the Germans began to establish contacts with an offer to remain aloof from the future war. Stalin probably felt like a marriageable bride when a whole line of “grooms” lined up for him.

Stalin did not trust any of the potential allies, but the British and French wanted the USSR to fight on their side, which made Stalin fear that in the end it would be mainly only the USSR that would fight, and the Germans promised a whole bunch of gifts just for the USSR to stay aside, which was much more consistent with the aspirations of Stalin himself (let the damned capitalists fight each other).

In addition, negotiations with England and France reached a dead end due to the Poles’ refusal to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory in the event of war (which was inevitable in a European war). In the end, the USSR decided to stay out of the war, concluding a non-aggression pact with the Germans.

Negotiations with the Finns

Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from negotiations in Moscow. October 16, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

Against the backdrop of all these diplomatic maneuvers, long negotiations with the Finns began. In 1938, the USSR invited the Finns to allow it to establish a military base on the island of Gogland. The Soviet side feared the possibility of a German attack from Finland and offered the Finns a mutual assistance agreement, and also gave guarantees that the USSR would stand up for Finland in the event of aggression from the Germans.

However, the Finns at that time adhered to strict neutrality (according to the laws in force, it was forbidden to join any unions and place military bases on their territory) and were afraid that such agreements would drag them into an unpleasant story or, what’s good, lead to war. Although the USSR offered to conclude an agreement secretly, so that no one would know about it, the Finns did not agree.

The second round of negotiations began in 1939. This time, the USSR wanted to lease a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland to strengthen the defense of Leningrad from the sea. Negotiations also ended without results.

The third round began in October 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the outbreak of World War II, when all the leading European powers were distracted by the war and the USSR largely had a free hand. This time the USSR proposed to arrange an exchange of territories. In exchange for the Karelian Isthmus and a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the USSR offered to give up very large territories of Eastern Karelia, even larger in size than those given by the Finns.

True, it is worth considering one fact: the Karelian Isthmus was a very developed territory in terms of infrastructure, where the second largest Finnish city of Vyborg was located and a tenth of the Finnish population lived, but the lands offered by the USSR in Karelia were, although large, but completely undeveloped and there were no there was nothing but forest. So the exchange was, to put it mildly, not entirely equal.

The Finns agreed to give up the islands, but could not afford to give up the Karelian Isthmus, which not only was a developed territory with a large population, but also the Mannerheim defensive line was located there, around which the entire Finnish defensive strategy was based. The USSR, on the contrary, was primarily interested in the isthmus, since this would make it possible to move the border away from Leningrad by at least several tens of kilometers. At that time, there were about 30 kilometers between the Finnish border and the outskirts of Leningrad.

Maynila incident

In the photographs: a Suomi submachine gun and Soviet soldiers digging up a pillar at the Maynila border post, November 30, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

Negotiations ended without result on November 9. And on November 26, an incident occurred near the border village of Maynila, which was used as a pretext to start a war. According to the Soviet side, an artillery shell flew from Finnish territory to Soviet territory, which killed three Soviet soldiers and a commander.

Molotov immediately sent a threatening demand to the Finns to withdraw their troops from the border 20-25 kilometers. The Finns stated that, based on the results of the investigation, it turned out that no one from the Finnish side fired and, probably, we are talking about some kind of accident on the Soviet side. The Finns responded by inviting both sides to withdraw troops from the border and conduct a joint investigation of the incident.

The next day, Molotov sent a note to the Finns accusing them of treachery and hostility, and announced the termination of the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Two days later, diplomatic relations were severed and Soviet troops went on the offensive.

Currently, most researchers believe that the incident was organized by the Soviet side in order to obtain a casus belli for attacking Finland. In any case, it is clear that the incident was just a pretext.

War

In the photo: a Finnish machine gun crew and a propaganda poster from the war. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

The main direction for the attack of the Soviet troops was the Karelian Isthmus, which was protected by a line of fortifications. This was the most suitable direction for a massive attack, which also made it possible to use tanks, which the Red Army had in abundance. It was planned to break through the defenses with a powerful blow, capture Vyborg and head towards Helsinki. The secondary direction was Central Karelia, where massive military operations were complicated by the undeveloped territory. The third blow was delivered from the north.

The first month of the war was a real disaster for the Soviet army. She was disorganized, disoriented, chaos and misunderstanding of the situation reigned at the headquarters. On the Karelian Isthmus, the army managed to advance several kilometers in a month, after which the soldiers came up against the Mannerheim Line and were unable to overcome it, since the army simply did not have heavy artillery.

In Central Karelia everything was even worse. Local forests opened up wide scope for guerrilla tactics, for which the Soviet divisions were not prepared. Small detachments of Finns attacked columns of Soviet troops moving along the roads, after which they quickly left and hid in forest caches. Mining of roads was also actively used, as a result of which Soviet troops suffered significant losses.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Soviet troops had insufficient quantities of camouflage robes and the soldiers were a convenient target for Finnish snipers in winter conditions. At the same time, the Finns used camouflage, which made them invisible.

The 163rd Soviet division was advancing in the Karelian direction, whose task was to reach the city of Oulu, which would cut Finland in two. For the offensive, the shortest direction between the Soviet border and the shore of the Gulf of Bothnia was specially chosen. Near the village of Suomussalmi, the division was surrounded. Only the 44th Division, which had arrived at the front and was reinforced by a tank brigade, was sent to help her.

The 44th Division moved along the Raat road, stretching for 30 kilometers. After waiting for the division to stretch out, the Finns defeated the Soviet division, which had a significant numerical superiority. Barriers were placed on the road from the north and south, which blocked the division in a narrow and well-exposed area, after which, with the help of small detachments, the division was cut up on the road into several mini-“cauldrons”.

As a result, the division suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, frostbitten and prisoners, lost almost all its equipment and heavy weapons, and the division command, which escaped from the encirclement, was shot by the verdict of a Soviet tribunal. Soon several more divisions were surrounded in a similar way, which managed to escape from the encirclement, suffering huge losses and losing most of their equipment. The most notable example is the 18th Division, which was surrounded in South Lemetti. Only one and a half thousand people managed to escape from the encirclement, with the division's regular strength being 15 thousand. The division's command was also executed by a Soviet tribunal.

The offensive in Karelia failed. Only in the northern direction did Soviet troops act more or less successfully and were able to cut off the enemy from access to the Barents Sea.

Finnish Democratic Republic

Propaganda leaflets, Finland, 1940. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

Almost immediately after the start of the war, in the border town of Terijoki, occupied by the Red Army, the so-called the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, which consisted of high-ranking communist figures of Finnish nationality who lived in the USSR. The USSR immediately recognized this government as the only official one and even concluded a mutual assistance agreement with it, according to which all the pre-war demands of the USSR regarding the exchange of territories and the organization of military bases were fulfilled.

The formation of the Finnish People's Army also began, which was planned to include soldiers of Finnish and Karelian nationalities. However, during the retreat, the Finns evacuated all their inhabitants, and it had to be replenished from soldiers of the corresponding nationalities already serving in the Soviet army, of whom there were not very many.

At first, the government was often featured in the press, but failures on the battlefield and unexpectedly stubborn Finnish resistance led to a prolongation of the war, which was clearly not part of the original plans of the Soviet leadership. Since the end of December, the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic has been mentioned less and less in the press, and from mid-January they no longer remember it; the USSR again recognizes as the official government the one that remained in Helsinki.

End of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In January 1940, there were no active hostilities due to severe frosts. The Red Army brought heavy artillery to the Karelian Isthmus to overcome the defensive fortifications of the Finnish army.

At the beginning of February, the general offensive of the Soviet army began. This time it was accompanied by artillery preparation and was much better thought out, which made the task easier for the attackers. By the end of the month, the first few lines of defense were broken, and at the beginning of March, Soviet troops approached Vyborg.

The Finns' initial plan was to hold off Soviet troops for as long as possible and wait for help from England and France. However, no help came from them. Under these conditions, further continuation of resistance was fraught with loss of independence, so the Finns entered into negotiations.

On March 12, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, which satisfied almost all the pre-war demands of the Soviet side.

What did Stalin want to achieve?

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

There is still no clear answer to the question of what Stalin’s goals were in this war. Was he really interested in moving the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad a hundred kilometers, or was he counting on the Sovietization of Finland? The first version is supported by the fact that in the peace treaty Stalin placed the main emphasis on this. The second version is supported by the creation of the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic headed by Otto Kuusinen.

Disputes about this have been ongoing for almost 80 years, but most likely, Stalin had both a minimum program, which included only territorial demands for the purpose of moving the border from Leningrad, and a maximum program, which provided for the Sovietization of Finland in case of a favorable combination of circumstances. However, the maximum program was quickly withdrawn due to the unfavorable course of the war. In addition to the fact that the Finns stubbornly resisted, they also evacuated the civilian population in the areas of the Soviet army's advance, and Soviet propagandists had practically no opportunity to work with the Finnish population.

Stalin himself explained the need for war in April 1940 at a meeting with the commanders of the Red Army: “Did the government and the party act correctly in declaring war on Finland? Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally. There, in the West, the three greatest powers were at each other's throats; when to decide the question of Leningrad, if not in such conditions, when our hands are full and we are presented with a favorable situation in order to strike them at this moment?

Results of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

The USSR achieved most of its goals, but it came at a great cost. The USSR suffered huge losses, significantly greater than the Finnish army. Figures in various sources differ (about 100 thousand killed, died from wounds and frostbite and missing), but everyone agrees that the Soviet army lost a significantly larger number of soldiers killed, missing and frostbite than the Finnish one.

The prestige of the Red Army was undermined. By the beginning of the war, the huge Soviet army not only outnumbered the Finnish one many times over, but was also much better armed. The Red Army had three times more artillery, 9 times more aircraft and 88 times more tanks. At the same time, the Red Army not only failed to take full advantage of its advantages, but also suffered a number of crushing defeats at the initial stage of the war.

The progress of the fighting was closely followed in both Germany and Britain, and they were surprised by the inept actions of the army. It is believed that it was as a result of the war with Finland that Hitler was finally convinced that an attack on the USSR was possible, since the Red Army was extremely weak on the battlefield. In Britain they also decided that the army was weakened by the purges of officers and were glad that they did not drag the USSR into allied relations.

Reasons for failure

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In Soviet times, the main failures of the army were associated with the Mannerheim Line, which was so well fortified that it was practically impregnable. However, in reality this was a very big exaggeration. A significant part of the defensive line consisted of wood-earth fortifications or old structures made of low-quality concrete that had become obsolete over 20 years.

On the eve of the war, the defensive line was fortified with several “million-dollar” pillboxes (so they were called because the construction of each fortification cost a million Finnish marks), but it was still not impregnable. As practice has shown, with proper preparation and support from aviation and artillery, even a much more advanced line of defense can be broken through, as happened with the French Maginot Line.

In fact, the failures were explained by a number of blunders of the command, both top and people on the ground:

1. underestimating the enemy. The Soviet command was confident that the Finns would not even bring it to war and would accept Soviet demands. And when the war began, the USSR was sure that victory would be a matter of a few weeks. The Red Army had too great an advantage in both personal strength and firepower;

2. disorganization of the army. The command structure of the Red Army was largely changed a year before the war as a result of massive purges in the ranks of the military. Some of the new commanders simply did not meet the necessary requirements, but even talented commanders had not yet had time to gain experience in commanding large military units. Confusion and chaos reigned in the units, especially in the conditions of the outbreak of war;

3. insufficient elaboration of offensive plans. The USSR was in a hurry to quickly resolve the issue with the Finnish border while Germany, France and Britain were still fighting in the West, so preparations for the offensive were carried out in a hurry. The Soviet plan included delivering the main attack along the Mannerheim Line, while there was virtually no intelligence information along the line. The troops had only extremely rough and sketchy plans for defensive fortifications, and later it turned out that they did not correspond to reality at all. In fact, the first assaults on the line took place blindly; in addition, light artillery did not cause serious damage to the defensive fortifications and to destroy them it was necessary to bring up heavy howitzers, which at first were practically absent from the advancing troops. Under these conditions, all assault attempts resulted in huge losses. Only in January 1940 did normal preparations for the breakthrough begin: assault groups were formed to suppress and capture firing points, aviation was involved in photographing the fortifications, which made it possible to finally obtain plans for the defensive lines and develop a competent breakthrough plan;

4. The Red Army was not sufficiently prepared to conduct combat operations in specific terrain in winter. There was not a sufficient number of camouflage robes, and there was not even warm clothing. All this stuff lay in warehouses and began to arrive in units only in the second half of December, when it became clear that the war was beginning to become protracted. At the beginning of the war, the Red Army did not have a single unit of combat skiers, which were used with great success by the Finns. Submachine guns, which turned out to be very effective in rough terrain, were generally absent in the Red Army. Shortly before the war, the PPD (Degtyarev submachine gun) was withdrawn from service, since it was planned to replace it with more modern and advanced weapons, but the new weapon was never received, and the old PPD went into warehouses;

5. The Finns took advantage of all the advantages of the terrain with great success. Soviet divisions, stuffed to the brim with equipment, were forced to move along roads and were practically unable to operate in the forest. The Finns, who had almost no equipment, waited until the clumsy Soviet divisions stretched along the road for several kilometers and, blocking the road, launched simultaneous attacks in several directions at once, cutting the divisions into separate parts. Trapped in a narrow space, Soviet soldiers became easy targets for Finnish squads of skiers and snipers. It was possible to escape from the encirclement, but this led to huge losses of equipment that had to be abandoned on the road;

6. The Finns used scorched earth tactics, but they did it competently. The entire population was evacuated in advance from the areas that were to be occupied by units of the Red Army, all property was also taken away, and empty settlements were destroyed or mined. This had a demoralizing effect on Soviet soldiers, to whom propaganda explained that they were going to liberate their brother workers and peasants from the unbearable oppression and abuse of the Finnish White Guards, but instead of crowds of joyful peasants and workers welcoming the liberators, they encountered only ashes and mined ruins.

However, despite all the shortcomings, the Red Army demonstrated the ability to improve and learn from its own mistakes as the war progressed. The unsuccessful start of the war contributed to the fact that they got down to business as normal, and in the second stage the army became much more organized and effective. At the same time, some mistakes were repeated again a year later, when the war with Germany began, which also went extremely poorly in the first months.

Evgeniy Antonyuk
Historian