A New Look

Triumphant defeat.

Why is the victory of the Red Army hidden?
in the "winter war"?
Version by Viktor Suvorov.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, called the "winter war", is known as one of the most shameful pages of Soviet military history. The huge Red Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Finnish militias for three and a half months, and as a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to a peace treaty with Finland.

Is the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces, Marshal Mannerheim, the winner of the “Winter War”?

The defeat of the Soviet Union in the “Winter War” is the most striking evidence of the weakness of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It serves as one of the main arguments for those historians and publicists who argue that the USSR was not preparing for war with Germany and that Stalin sought by any means to delay the entry of the Soviet Union into the world conflict.
Indeed, it is unlikely that Stalin could have planned an attack on a strong and well-armed Germany at a time when the Red Army suffered such a shameful defeat in battles with such a small and weak enemy.

However, is the “shameful defeat” of the Red Army in the “Winter War” an obvious axiom that does not require proof? To understand this issue, let's first look at the facts.

Preparing for war: Stalin's plans

The Soviet-Finnish war began on the initiative of Moscow. On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government demanded that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula, hand over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko for a long term as a naval base. In exchange, Moscow offered Finland a territory twice the size, but unsuitable for economic activity and strategically useless.

The Finnish government did not reject the claims of its “great neighbor”. Even Marshal Mannerheim, who was considered a supporter of a pro-German orientation, spoke in favor of a compromise with Moscow. In mid-October, Soviet-Finnish negotiations began and lasted less than a month. On November 9, the negotiations broke down, but the Finns were ready for a new bargain. By mid-November, tensions in Soviet-Finnish relations seemed to have eased somewhat. The Finnish government even called on residents of border areas who moved inland during the conflict to return to their homes. However, at the end of the same month, on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops attacked the Finnish border.
Naming the reasons that prompted Stalin to start a war against Finland, Soviet (now Russian!) researchers and a significant part of Western scientists indicate that the main goal of Soviet aggression was the desire to secure Leningrad. They say that when the Finns refused to exchange lands, Stalin wanted to seize part of the Finnish territory near Leningrad in order to better protect the city from attack.
This is an obvious lie! The true purpose of the attack on Finland is obvious - the Soviet leadership intended to seize this country and include it in the "Indestructible Alliance..." Back in August 1939, during secret Soviet-German negotiations on the division of spheres of influence, Stalin and Molotov insisted on the inclusion of Finland (along with the three Baltic states) into the "Soviet sphere of influence". Finland was to become the first country in a series of states that Stalin planned to annex to his power.
The aggression was planned long before the attack. The Soviet and Finnish delegations were still discussing possible conditions for a territorial exchange, and in Moscow the future communist government of Finland was already being formed - the so-called “People's Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic”. It was headed by one of the founders of the Communist Party of Finland, Otto Kuusinen, who lived permanently in Moscow and worked in the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Otto Kuusinen - Stalin's candidate for Finnish leader.

Group of leaders of the Comintern. Standing first on the left is O. Kuusinen

Later, O. Kuusinen became a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was appointed deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1957-1964 was secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Kuusinen was matched by other “ministers” of the “people’s government”, which was supposed to arrive in Helsinki in the convoy of Soviet troops and announce the “voluntary accession” of Finland to the USSR. At the same time, under the leadership of NKVD officers, units of the so-called “Red Army of Finland” were created, which were assigned the role of “extras” in the planned performance.

Chronicle of the "Winter War"

However, the performance did not work out. The Soviet military planned to quickly capture Finland, which did not have a strong army. People's Commissar of Defense "Stalin's Eagle" Voroshilov boasted that in six days the Red Army would be in Helsinki.
But already in the first days of the offensive, Soviet troops encountered stubborn resistance from the Finns.

Finnish rangers are the mainstay of Mannerheim's army.

Having advanced 25-60 km deep into Finnish territory, the Red Army was stopped on the narrow Karelian Isthmus. Finnish defensive troops dug into the ground along the Mannerheim Line and repelled all Soviet attacks. The 7th Army, commanded by General Meretskov, suffered heavy losses. Additional troops sent by the Soviet command to Finland were surrounded by mobile Finnish detachments of skier warriors, who made sudden raids from the forests, exhausting and bleeding the aggressors.
For a month and a half, a huge Soviet army trampled on the Karelian Isthmus. At the end of December, the Finns even tried to launch a counteroffensive, but they clearly did not have enough strength.
The failures of the Soviet troops forced Stalin to take emergency measures. On his orders, several high-ranking commanders were publicly shot in the army; General Semyon Timoshenko (future People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), close to the leader, became the new commander of the main North-Western Front. To break through the Mannerheim Line, additional reinforcements were sent to Finland, as well as NKVD barrier detachments.

Semyon Timoshenko - leader of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line"

On January 15, 1940, Soviet artillery began a massive shelling of Finnish defense positions, which lasted 16 days. At the beginning of February, 140 thousand soldiers and more than a thousand tanks were thrown into the offensive in the Karelian sector. Fierce fighting raged on the narrow isthmus for two weeks. Only on February 17 did Soviet troops manage to break through the Finnish defenses, and on February 22, Marshal Mannerheim ordered the army to be withdrawn to a new defensive line.
Although the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and capture the city of Vyborg, the Finnish troops were not defeated. The Finns managed to once again gain a foothold on new frontiers. Mobile units of Finnish partisans operated in the rear of the occupying army and carried out daring attacks on enemy units. The Soviet troops were exhausted and battered; their losses were enormous. One of Stalin's generals bitterly admitted:
- We conquered exactly enough Finnish territory to bury our dead.
Under these conditions, Stalin chose again to propose to the Finnish government to resolve the territorial issue through negotiations. The Secretary General chose not to mention plans for Finland to join the Soviet Union. By that time, Kuusinen's puppet "people's government" and his "Red Army" had already been slowly disbanded. As compensation, the failed “leader of Soviet Finland” received the post of Chairman of the Supreme Council of the newly created Karelo-Finnish SSR. And some of his colleagues in the “cabinet of ministers” were simply shot - apparently so as not to get in the way...
The Finnish government immediately agreed to negotiations. Although the Red Army suffered heavy losses, it was clear that the small Finnish defense would not be able to stop the Soviet offensive for long.
Negotiations began at the end of February. On the night of March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was concluded between the USSR and Finland.

The head of the Finnish delegation announces the signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Finnish delegation accepted all Soviet demands: Helsinki ceded to Moscow the Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri, the northeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, the port of Hanko and the Rybachy Peninsula - a total of about 34 thousand square kilometers of the country's territory.

Results of the war: victory or defeat.

So these are the basic facts. Having remembered them, we can now try to analyze the results of the “winter war”.
Obviously, as a result of the war, Finland found itself in a worse position: in March 1940, the Finnish government was forced to make much larger territorial concessions than those demanded by Moscow in October 1939. Thus, at first glance, Finland was defeated.

Marshal Mannerheim managed to defend the independence of Finland.

However, the Finns managed to defend their independence. The Soviet Union, which started the war, did not achieve its main goal - the annexation of Finland to the USSR. Moreover, the failures of the Red Army's offensive in December 1939 - the first half of January 1940 caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union and, first of all, its armed forces. The whole world laughed at the huge army that trampled on a narrow isthmus for a month and a half, unable to break the resistance of the tiny Finnish army.
Politicians and military men rushed to conclude that the Red Army was weak. They especially closely followed developments on the Soviet-Finnish front in Berlin. German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary back in November 1939:
“The Russian army is worth little. It is poorly led and even worse armed...”
A few days later, Hitler repeated the same thought:
"The Fuhrer once again identifies the catastrophic state of the Russian army. It is barely capable of fighting... It is possible that the average level of intelligence of the Russians does not allow them to produce modern weapons."
It seemed that the course of the Soviet-Finnish war completely confirmed the opinion of the Nazi leaders. On January 5, 1940, Goebbels wrote in his diary:
"In Finland the Russians are not making any progress at all. It looks like the Red Army isn't really worth much."
The theme of the weakness of the Red Army was constantly discussed at the Fuhrer's headquarters. Hitler himself stated on January 13:
“You still can’t get more out of the Russians... This is very good for us. A weak partner in our neighbors is better than an equally good comrade in the alliance.”
On January 22, Hitler and his associates again discussed the course of military operations in Finland and came to the conclusion:
"Moscow is very weak militarily..."

Adolf Hitler was sure that the "winter war" revealed the weakness of the Red Army.

And in March, the representative of the Nazi press at the Fuhrer’s headquarters, Heinz Lorenz, already openly mocked the Soviet army:
"...Russian soldiers are just fun. Not a trace of discipline..."
Not only Nazi leaders, but also serious military analysts considered the failures of the Red Army to be evidence of its weakness. Analyzing the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, the German General Staff in a report to Hitler made the following conclusion:
"The Soviet masses cannot resist a professional army with skillful command."
Thus, the “winter war” dealt a strong blow to the authority of the Red Army. And although the Soviet Union achieved very significant territorial concessions in this conflict, in strategic terms it suffered a shameful defeat. In any case, this is what almost all historians who studied the Soviet-Finnish war believe.
But Viktor Suvorov, not trusting the opinion of the most authoritative researchers, decided to check for himself: did the Red Army really show weakness and inability to fight during the “Winter War”?
The results of his analysis were amazing.

A historian is at war with... a computer

First of all, Viktor Suvorov decided to simulate on a powerful analytical computer the conditions in which the Red Army fought. He entered the necessary parameters into a special program:

Temperature - up to minus 40 degrees Celsius;
snow cover depth - one and a half meters;
relief - sharply rugged terrain, forests, swamps, lakes
and so on.
And every time the smart computer answered:

IMPOSSIBLE

IMPOSSIBLE
at this temperature;
with such a depth of snow cover;
with such terrain
and so on...

The computer refused to simulate the course of the Red Army's offensive within the given parameters, recognizing them as unacceptable for conducting offensive operations.
Then Suvorov decided to abandon the modeling of natural conditions and suggested that the computer plan a breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” without taking into account climate and terrain.
Here it is necessary to explain what the Finnish “Mannerheim Line” was.

Marshal Mannerheim personally supervised the construction of fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border.

The “Mannerheim Line” was a system of defensive fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border, 135 kilometers long and up to 90 kilometers deep. The first strip of the line included: extensive minefields, anti-tank ditches and granite boulders, reinforced concrete tetrahedrons, wire barriers in 10-30 rows. Behind the first line was the second: reinforced concrete fortifications 3-5 floors underground - real underground fortresses made of fortification concrete, covered with armor plates and multi-ton granite boulders. Each fortress has an ammunition and fuel warehouse, a water supply system, a power plant, rest rooms, and operating rooms. And then again - forest rubble, new minefields, scarps, barriers...
Having received detailed information about the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line, the computer clearly answered:

Main attack direction: Lintura - Viipuri
before the attack - fire preparation
first explosion: airborne, epicenter - Kanneljärvi, equivalent - 50 kilotons,
height - 300
second explosion: airborne, epicenter - Lounatjoki, equivalent...
third explosion...

But the Red Army did not have nuclear weapons in 1939!
Therefore, Suvorov introduced a new condition into the program: to attack the “Mannerheim Line” without the use of nuclear weapons.
And again the computer answered categorically:

Conducting offensive operations
IMPOSSIBLE

A powerful analytical computer declared a breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” in winter conditions without the use of nuclear weapons IMPOSSIBLE four times, five times, many times...
But the Red Army made this breakthrough! Even if after long battles, even at the cost of enormous human casualties, but still in February 1940, the “Russian soldiers”, about whom they mockingly gossiped at the Fuhrer’s headquarters, accomplished the impossible - they broke through the “Mannerheim Line”.
Another thing is that this heroic feat did not make sense, that in general this whole war was a rash adventure generated by the ambitions of Stalin and his parquet “eagles”.
But militarily, the “winter war” demonstrated not the weakness, but the power of the Red Army, its ability to carry out even the IMPOSSIBLE order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Hitler and company did not understand this, many military experts did not understand, and after them, modern historians did not understand either.

Who lost the "winter war"?

However, not all contemporaries agreed with Hitler’s assessment of the results of the “Winter War”. Thus, the Finns who fought with the Red Army did not laugh at the “Russian soldiers” and did not talk about the “weakness” of the Soviet troops. When Stalin invited them to end the war, they very quickly agreed. And not only did they agree, but without much debate they ceded strategically important territories to the Soviet Union - much larger than Moscow demanded before the war. And the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, spoke of the Red Army with great respect. He considered the Soviet troops modern and effective and had a high opinion of their fighting qualities:
“Russian soldiers learn quickly, grasp everything on the fly, act without delay, easily obey discipline, are distinguished by courage and sacrifice and are ready to fight to the last bullet, despite the hopelessness of the situation,” the marshal believed.

Mannerheim had the opportunity to verify the courage of the Red Army soldiers. Marshal on the front line.

And the Finns’ neighbors, the Swedes, also commented with respect and admiration on the breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” by the Red Army. And in the Baltic countries they also did not make fun of the Soviet troops: in Tallinn, Kaunas and Riga they watched in horror the actions of the Red Army in Finland.
Viktor Suvorov noted:
“The fighting in Finland ended on March 13, 1940, and already in the summer three Baltic states: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered to Stalin without a fight and turned into “republics” of the Soviet Union.”
Indeed, the Baltic countries drew a completely clear conclusion from the results of the “winter war”: the USSR has a powerful and modern army, ready to carry out any order, without stopping at any sacrifice. And in June 1940, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered without resistance, and in early August “the family of Soviet republics was replenished with three new members.”

Soon after the Winter War, the three Baltic states disappeared from the world map.

At the same time, Stalin demanded from the Romanian government the “return” of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which were part of the Russian Empire before the revolution. Taking into account the experience of the “winter war”, the Romanian government did not even bargain: on June 26, 1940, Stalin’s ultimatum was sent, and on June 28, units of the Red Army “in accordance with the agreement” crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia. On June 30, a new Soviet-Romanian border was established.
Consequently, it can be considered that as a result of the “winter war” the Soviet Union not only annexed the Finnish border lands, but also had the opportunity to capture three entire countries and a considerable part of a fourth country without fighting. So, in strategic terms, Stalin still won this massacre.
So, Finland did not lose the war - the Finns managed to defend the independence of their state.
The Soviet Union did not lose the war either - as a result, the Baltics and Romania submitted to the dictates of Moscow.
Who then lost the “winter war”?
Viktor Suvorov answered this question, as always, paradoxically:
"Hitler lost the war in Finland."
Yes, the Nazi leader, who closely followed the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, made the biggest mistake that a statesman can make: he underestimated the enemy. “Not understanding this war, not appreciating its difficulties, Hitler made catastrophically wrong conclusions. For some reason he suddenly decided that the Red Army was not ready for war, that the Red Army was not capable of anything.”
Hitler miscalculated. And in April 1945 he paid with his life for this miscalculation...

Soviet historiography
- in the footsteps of Hitler

However, Hitler very soon realized his mistake. Already on August 17, 1941, just a month and a half after the start of the war with the USSR, he told Goebbels:
- We seriously underestimated Soviet combat readiness and, mainly, the weapons of the Soviet army. We had no idea what the Bolsheviks had at their disposal. Therefore the assessment was given incorrectly...
- Perhaps it is very good that we did not have such an accurate idea of ​​​​the potential of the Bolsheviks. Otherwise, perhaps we would be horrified by the urgent question of the East and the proposed attack on the Bolsheviks...
And on September 5, 1941, Goebbels admitted - but only to himself, in his diary:
"...We incorrectly assessed the Bolshevik resistance force, we had incorrect digital data and based all our policies on them."

Hitler and Mannerheim in 1942. The Fuhrer has already realized his mistake.

True, Hitler and Goebbels did not admit that the cause of the disaster was their self-confidence and incompetence. They tried to shift all the blame onto the “treachery of Moscow.” Speaking to his comrades at the Wolfschanze headquarters on April 12, 1942, the Fuhrer said:
- The Russians... carefully hid everything that was in any way connected with their military power. The entire war with Finland in 1940... is nothing more than a grandiose campaign of disinformation, since Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.
But, one way or another, Hitler and Goebbels admitted that, analyzing the results of the “winter war,” they were mistaken in assessing the potential and strength of the Red Army.
However, to this day, 57 years after this recognition, most historians and publicists continue to prattle on about the “shameful defeat” of the Red Army.
Why do communist and other “progressive” historians so persistently repeat the theses of Nazi propaganda about the “weakness” of the Soviet armed forces, about their “unpreparedness for war”, why, following Hitler and Goebbels, do they describe the “inferiority” and “lack of training” of Russian soldiers and officers?
Viktor Suvorov believes that behind all these rantings lies the desire of official Soviet (now Russian!) historiography to hide the truth about the pre-war state of the Red Army. Soviet falsifiers and their Western “progressive” allies, despite all the facts, are trying to convince the public that on the eve of Germany’s attack on the USSR, Stalin did not even think about aggression (as if there was no seizure of the Baltic countries and part of Romania), but was only concerned with “ensuring border security” .
In fact (and the “winter war” confirms this!) The Soviet Union already at the end of the 30s had one of the most powerful armies, armed with modern military equipment and manned by well-trained and disciplined soldiers. This powerful military machine was created by Stalin for the Great Victories of Communism in Europe, and perhaps throughout the world.
On June 22, 1941, preparations for the World Revolution were interrupted by a sudden attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler's Germany.

References.

• Bullock A. Hitler and Stalin: Life and Power. Per. from English Smolensk, 1994
• Mary V. Mannerheim - Marshal of Finland. Per. with Swedish M., 1997
• Picker G. Hitler's Table Talks. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993
• Rzhevskaya E. Goebbels: Portrait against the background of a diary. M., 1994
• Suvorov V. The Last Republic: Why the Soviet Union Lost the Second World War. M., 1998

Read the material in the following issues
ACADEMIC BULLYING
about the controversy surrounding the research of Viktor Suvorov

Soviet-Finnish War 1939 - 1940

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 (Finnish) talvisota - Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland with the second largest city of Vyborg. 430 thousand inhabitants lost their homes and moved into the interior of Finland, creating a number of social problems.

According to a number of foreign historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland dates back to the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict, not part of the Second World War, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. The declaration of war led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR was declared a military aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations.

A group of Red Army soldiers with a captured Finnish flag

Background
Events of 1917-1937

On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR addressed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war began in Finland, in which the “reds” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, were opposed by the “whites”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the “whites”. After the victory in Finland, the Finnish “White” troops provided support to the separatist movement in Eastern Karelia. The first Soviet-Finnish war that began during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yuryev) Peace Treaty was concluded between these states. Some Finnish politicians such as Juho Paasikivi, regarded the treaty as “too good a peace,” believing that superpowers would only compromise when absolutely necessary.

Juho Kusti Paasikivi

Mannerheim, former activists and separatist leaders in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a disgrace and a betrayal of their compatriots, and the representative of Rebol Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (Finnish: H. H. (Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Nevertheless, relations between Finland and The USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula, went to Finland in the North, in the Arctic, were not friendly, but also openly hostile Same. Finland was afraid of Soviet aggression, and the Soviet leadership practically ignored Finland until 1938, focusing on the largest capitalist countries, primarily Great Britain and France.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of ​​general disarmament and security, embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles in Western Europe, especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their weapons. In Finland, the government and the majority of parliament members have consistently cut spending on defense and weapons. Since 1927, due to cost savings, military exercises have not been held at all. The allocated money was barely enough to maintain the army. The issue of spending on weapons provision was not considered in parliament. Tanks and military aircraft were completely absent.

Interesting fact:
The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.

Coast Guard battleship “Väinämöinen”

Finnish coastal defense battleship Väinemäinen entered service in 1932. It was built at the Creighton-Vulcan shipyard in Turku. It was a relatively large ship: its total displacement was 3900 tons, length 92.96, width 16.92 and draft 4.5 meters. The armament consisted of 2 two-gun 254 mm cannons, 4 two-gun 105 mm cannons and 14 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The ship had strong armor: the thickness of the side armor was 51, the deck - up to 19, the turrets - 102 millimeters. The crew numbered 410 people.

Nevertheless, the Defense Council was created, which on July 10, 1931 was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim.

He was firmly convinced that as long as the Bolshevik government was in power in Russia, the situation in it was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: “The plague coming from the east could be contagious.” In a conversation with Risto Ryti, then the governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, which took place that same year, he outlined his thoughts on the need to quickly resolve the issue of creating a military program and its financing. Ryti, after listening to the argument, asked the question: “But what is the benefit of providing the military department with such large sums if no war is expected?”

Since 1919, the leader of the Socialist Party was Väinö Tanner.

Väine Alfred Tanner

During the Civil War, his company's warehouses served as a base for the Communists, and then he became the editor of an influential newspaper, a strong opponent of defense spending. Mannerheim refused to meet with him, realizing that by doing so he would only reduce his efforts to strengthen the defense capability of the state. As a result, by decision of parliament, the defense expenditure line of the budget was further cut.
In August 1931, after inspecting the defensive structures of the Enckel Line, created in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for modern warfare, both due to its unfortunate location and destruction by time.
In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.

In the 1934 budget, adopted after the signing of a non-aggression pact with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was crossed out.

Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of parliament:
...still believes that a prerequisite for preserving the country's independence is such progress in the well-being of the people and the general conditions of their life, in which every citizen understands that this is worth all the costs of defense.
Mannerheim describes his efforts as “a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow pipe filled with resin.” It seemed to him that all his initiatives to unite the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future were met with a blank wall of misunderstanding and indifference. And he filed a petition for removal from his position.
Negotiations of Yartsev in 1938-1939

The negotiations were started at the initiative of the USSR; initially they were conducted in secret, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain “free hands” in the face of an unclear prospect in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view from the point of view of domestic politics, since the population of Finland had a generally negative attitude towards the USSR.
On April 14, 1938, Second Secretary Boris Yartsev arrived at the USSR Embassy in Finland in Helsinki. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the position of the USSR: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side attack through Finland. That is why Finland’s attitude towards the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait on the border if Finland allows the landing. On the other hand, if Finland resists the Germans, the USSR will provide it with military and economic assistance, since Finland itself is not able to repel the German landing. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Kajander and Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner. The Finnish side's guarantees that Finland would not allow its territorial integrity to be violated and Soviet Russia to be invaded through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, first of all, in the event of a German attack, to participate in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Åland Islands and to receive military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Finnish: Suursaari). No territorial demands were made. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.
In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tyutyarsaari, and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, they offered Finland territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they could not be defended or used to protect the Karelian Isthmus. Negotiations ended without result on April 6, 1939.
On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany entered into a Non-Aggression Treaty. According to the secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-interference in the event of war. Germany began World War II by attacking Poland a week later on September 1, 1939. USSR troops entered Polish territory on September 17.
From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.
On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Finnish government stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the agreement between the USSR and Germany had already eliminated the main reason for the Soviet Union’s demands on Finland—the danger of a German attack through Finnish territory.
Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for negotiations “on specific political issues.” The negotiations took place in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4, and November 9.
For the first time, Finland was represented by the envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. On the third trip, State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added.
At these negotiations, for the first time, the proximity of the border to Leningrad is discussed. Joseph Stalin noted: “We can’t do anything about geography, just like you... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border further away from it”
The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side to the Finnish delegation in Moscow looked like this:

1. Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.
2. Finland agrees to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.
3. The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko Peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohya (Finnish) Russian.
4. Finland transfers to the USSR the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Moshchny), Tytyarsaari, Seiskari.
5. The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.
6.Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
7.The USSR transfers to Finland territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as the Finnish one received (5,529 km?).
8.The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Åland Islands with Finland’s own forces.


Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from negotiations in Moscow. October 16, 1939.

The USSR proposed an exchange of territories, in which Finland would receive larger territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboli and in Porayarvi (Finnish) Russian. These were territories that declared independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty The treaty remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which had concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised agreeing to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that demands for military bases should be accepted, and there was no point in hoping for German help.
The State Council did not comply with all the demands of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Moshchny), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Berezovy) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and those closest to Leningrad territories in Terijoki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deep into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.
Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers from the reserve were called up for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.
Sweden has made its position of neutrality clear, and there have been no serious assurances of assistance from other states.
Since mid-1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the Main Military Council of the USSR discussed the operational plan for the attack on Finland, and starting in mid-September, the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.
In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, where they practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attaches were invited, except the Soviet one.

President of Finland Risto Heikki Ryti (center) and Marshal K. Mannerheim

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept Soviet conditions, since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issues of ensuring the security of Leningrad, in turn trying to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the consent of the USSR to armament of the Aland Islands, the demilitarized status of which governed by the Åland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim Line”.
The Finns insisted on their position, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the proposed garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” /V.Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist to his parliament on the need to find a compromise, declaring that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.
On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was caused by the intervention of third-party states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions.
Negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately reached a dead end. The Soviet side followed with a statement: “We civilians have made no progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers.”
However, Stalin again made concessions the next day, offering to buy it instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, then Minister of Finance and part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals opened the way to reaching an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.
On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: “We will throw to hell all the games of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking down any and all obstacles on the way to the goal.” On the same day, troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to prepare military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin outwardly demonstrated a sincere desire to achieve a compromise on the issue of military bases, but the Finns refused to discuss it and on November 13 left for Helsinki.
There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered as confirmation of the correctness of its position.
On November 26, Pravda published an article “A buffoon at the post of Prime Minister,” which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign.

K.. Mannerheim and A. Hitler

On the same day, there was an artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR near the settlement of Maynila, staged by the Soviet side, which is confirmed by the corresponding orders of Mannerheim, who was confident in the inevitability of a Soviet provocation and therefore had previously withdrawn troops from the border to a distance that would exclude the occurrence of misunderstandings. The USSR leadership blamed Finland for this incident. In Soviet information agencies, to the terms widely used to name hostile elements: White Guard, White Pole, White emigrant, a new one was added - White Finn.
On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland was announced, and on November 30, Soviet troops were given the order to go on the offensive.
Causes of the war
According to statements from the Soviet side, the USSR's goal was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border even in the event of war breaking out (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the first days (or even hours) of the war.
It is alleged that the measures we are taking are aimed against the independence of Finland or to interfere in its internal and external affairs. This is the same malicious slander. We consider Finland, whatever regime may exist there, to be an independent and sovereign state in all its foreign and domestic policies. We firmly stand for the Finnish people to decide their internal and external affairs, as they themselves see fit.

Molotov assessed Finnish policy more harshly in a report on March 29, where he spoke of “hostility towards our country in the ruling and military circles of Finland” and praised the peaceful policy of the USSR:

The peaceful foreign policy of the USSR was demonstrated here too with complete certainty. The Soviet Union immediately declared that it stood on a position of neutrality and steadily pursued this policy throughout the entire period.

— Report by V. M. Molotov at the VI session of the Supreme USSR on March 29, 1940
Did the Government and Party do the right thing by declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army.
Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require moving the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, doubtfully increased the security of Leningrad. There was only one constant in the demands: to obtain military bases on the territory of Finland, and near its coast, to oblige Finland not to ask for help from third countries other than the USSR.
On the second day of the war, a puppet force was created on the territory of the USSR Terijoki government, led by Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen.

Otto Vilhelmovich Kuusinen

On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti.

We can assume with a high degree of confidence: if things at the front had gone according to the operational plan, then this “government” would have arrived in Helsinki with a specific political goal - to unleash a civil war in the country. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called […] to overthrow the “government of executioners.” Kuusinen’s address to the soldiers of the Finnish People’s Army directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the Democratic Republic of Finland on the building of the Presidential Palace in Helsinki.
However, in reality, this “government” was used only as a means, although not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov’s statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow Assarsson on March 4, 1940 that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union, then subsequent Soviet conditions peace will be even tougher, and the USSR will then agree to a final agreement with the “government” of Kuusinen.

- M.I. Semiryaga. "Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy. 1941-1945"

There is an opinion that Stalin planned, as a result of a victorious war, to include Finland into the USSR, which was part of the sphere of interests of the USSR according to the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, and negotiations with conditions that were obviously unacceptable for the then Finnish government were carried out only for the purpose of , so that after their inevitable breakdown there will be a reason to declare war. In particular, the desire to annex Finland explains the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic in December 1939. In addition, the plan for the exchange of territories provided by the Soviet Union assumed the transfer of territories beyond the Mannerheim Line to the USSR, thus opening a direct road for Soviet troops to Helsinki. The conclusion of peace could be caused by the realization of the fact that an attempt to forcefully Sovietize Finland would encounter massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the German side.
Strategic plans of the parties
USSR plan

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of military operations in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was planned to conduct a direct breakthrough of the “Mannerheim Line” (it should be noted that the Soviet command had practically no information about the very presence of a powerful line of defense. It is no coincidence that Mannerheim himself was surprised to learn of the existence of such a line of defense) in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of troops by Finland’s Western allies from the Barents Sea. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army received the opportunity to wage war on flat territory that did not have serious long-term fortifications. In such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself in the most complete way. After breaking through the fortifications, it was planned to launch an attack on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. At the same time, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and access to the Norwegian border in the Arctic were planned.

Red Army party meeting in the trenches

The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. The estimate of the number of Finnish troops also turned out to be incorrect - “it was believed that the Finnish army in wartime would have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions.” In addition, the Soviet command did not take into account the presence of a serious line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, and by the beginning of the war they had only “sketchy intelligence information” about them.
Finland plan
The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line”, consisting of several fortified defensive lines with concrete and wood-earth firing points, communication trenches, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers for frontal fire, 48 new and modernized bunkers that had from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery bunkers and one machine-gun-artillery caponier. In total, 130 long-term fire structures were located along a line about 140 km long from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. Very powerful and complex fortifications were created in 1930–1939. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the state’s financial capabilities, and the people called them “millionaires” due to their high cost.

The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fortified with numerous artillery batteries on the shore and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to coordinate the fire of Finnish and Estonian batteries with the aim of completely blocking the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work - by the beginning of the war, Estonia provided its territories for military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aviation for air strikes on Finland.

Finnish soldier with a Lahti SalorantaM-26 machine gun

Finnish soldiers

Finnish sniper - “cuckoo” Simo Høihe. On his combat account there are about 700 Red Army soldiers (in the Red Army he was nicknamed -

" White death ".

FINNISH ARMY

1. Soldier in uniform 1927 (the toes of the boots are pointed and turned up). 2-3. Soldiers in uniform 1936 4. A soldier in a 1936 uniform with a helmet. 5. Soldier with equipment, introduced at the end of the war. 6. An officer in winter uniform. 7. Huntsman in a snow mask and winter camouflage coat. 8. A soldier in a winter guard uniform. 9. Pilot. 10. Aviation Sergeant. 11. German helmet model 1916 12. German helmet model 1935 13. Finnish helmet, approved in time of war. 14. German helmet model 1935 with the emblem of the 4th light infantry detachment, 1939-1940. They also wore helmets captured from the Soviets. soldier. All these hats and different types of uniforms were worn at the same time, sometimes in the same unit.

FINNISH NAVY

Finnish Army insignia

On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The section of the border north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, preparations were made in advance for guerrilla operations, for which there were all the conditions: wooded and swampy terrain where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads on which enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to accommodate aircraft from the Western Allies.
The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee rapid stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment on the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently restrain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then carry out a counter-offensive in Karelia.

Armed forces of opponents
Balance of forces by November 30, 1939:

The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below shows how many days of the war the supplies in the warehouses lasted:
-Cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns for - 2.5 months
-Shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - 1 month
-Fuels and lubricants - for 2 months
- Aviation gasoline - for 1 month

The Finnish military industry was represented by one state-owned cartridge factory, one gunpowder factory and one artillery factory. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.

Soviet bomber DB-3F (IL-4)

The Finnish division included: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one communications company, one engineer company, one quartermaster company.
The Soviet division included: three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one battery of anti-tank guns, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, one engineering battalion.
The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in numbers (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:

The Soviet division was twice as powerful as the Finnish division in terms of the total firepower of machine guns and mortars, and three times as powerful in artillery firepower. The Red Army did not have machine guns in service, but this was partially compensated by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; They had at their disposal numerous tank brigades, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.
Regarding the difference in the level of weapons on December 2 (2 days after the start of the war), Leningradskaya Pravda will write:

You can’t help but admire the valiant soldiers of the Red Army, armed with the latest sniper rifles and shiny automatic light machine guns. The armies of two worlds collided. The Red Army is the most peace-loving, the most heroic, powerful, equipped with advanced technology, and the army of the corrupt Finnish government, which the capitalists force to rattle their sabers. And the weapon, let’s be honest, is old and worn. There is not enough gunpowder for more.

Red Army soldier with an SVT-40 rifle

However, within a month the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the “Mannerheim Line”, difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbitten, was stuck in the Finnish forests. Starting with Molotov’s report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable “Mannerheim Line”, similar to the “Maginot Line” and “Siegfried Line”, which have not yet been crushed by any army, begins to live.
Cause of war and breakdown of relations

Nikita Khrushchev writes in his memoirs that at a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin said: “Let's start today... We will just raise our voices a little, and the Finns will only have to obey. If they persist, we will fire only one shot, and the Finns will immediately raise their hands and surrender.”
The official cause of war was the Maynila Incident: On November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which stated that as a result of artillery shelling carried out from Finnish territory, four Soviet soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. Finnish border guards recorded cannon shots from several observation points that day. The fact of the shots and the direction from which they came were recorded, and a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government proposed creating an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish agreement on mutual non-aggression.
The next day, Molotov accused Finland of “desiring to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling” and stated that the USSR “from now on considers itself free from the obligations” undertaken by virtue of the previously concluded non-aggression pact. Many years later, the former head of the Leningrad TASS bureau, Antselovich, said that he received a package with the text of a message about the “Maynila incident” and the inscription “open by special order” two weeks before the incident. The USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 am, Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities. War was never officially declared.
Mannerheim, who as commander-in-chief had the most reliable information about the incident near Maynila, reports:
...And now the provocation that I had been expecting since mid-October happened. When I personally visited the Karelian Isthmus on October 26, General Nennonen assured me that the artillery was completely withdrawn behind the line of fortifications, from where not a single battery was able to fire a shot beyond the border... ...We did not have to wait long for the implementation of Molotov’s words spoken at Moscow negotiations: “Now it will be the soldiers’ turn to talk.” On November 26, the Soviet Union organized a provocation now known as “Shots at Maynila”... During the 1941-1944 war, Russian prisoners described in detail how the clumsy provocation was organized...
In Soviet textbooks on the history of the USSR, responsibility for the outbreak of the war was placed on Finland and Western countries: “The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. At the end of 1939, they managed to provoke Finnish reactionaries to war against the USSR. England and France actively helped the Finns with arms supplies and were preparing to send their troops to help them. German fascism also provided hidden assistance to the Finnish reaction. The defeat of the Finnish troops thwarted the plans of the Anglo-French imperialists. In March 1940, the war between Finland and the USSR ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Moscow.”
In Soviet propaganda, the need for a reason was not advertised, and in the songs of that time the mission of Soviet soldiers was presented as liberating. An example would be the song “Accept us, Suomi beauty.” The task of liberating the workers of Finland from the oppression of the imperialists was an additional explanation for the outbreak of the war, suitable for propaganda within the USSR.
On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Aarno Yrj?-Koskinen (Finnish: AarnoYrj?-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note from the Soviet government. It stated that in view of the current situation, for which responsibility falls on the Finnish government, the USSR government came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the Finnish government and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland.
Early in the morning of November 30, the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations from the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border of Finland at 8 o’clock in the morning on November 30 on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas.”
War

Order of the Leningrad Military District The patience of the Soviet people and the Red Army has come to an end. It's time to teach a lesson to the presumptuous and insolent political gamblers who have blatantly challenged the Soviet people, and to completely destroy the center of anti-Soviet provocations and threats to Leningrad! Comrades Red Army soldiers, commanders, commissars and political workers! Fulfilling the sacred will of the Soviet government and our great people, I order: The troops of the Leningrad Military District cross the border, defeat the Finnish troops and once and for all ensure the security of the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union and the city of Lenin - the cradle of the proletarian revolution. We are going to Finland not as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of landowners and capitalists. We are not going against the Finnish people, but against the government of Kajander-Erkko, which oppresses the Finnish people and provoked a war with the USSR. We respect the freedom and independence of Finland, received by the Finnish people as a result of the October Revolution and the victory of Soviet power. The Russian Bolsheviks, led by Lenin and Stalin, fought for this independence together with the Finnish people. For the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR and the glorious city of Lenin! For our beloved Motherland! For the Great Stalin! Forward, sons of the Soviet people, soldiers of the Red Army, to the complete destruction of the enemy! Commander of the Leningrad Military District Comrade K.A.Meretskov Member of the Military Council Comrade A.A.Zhdanov Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov Andrey Aleksandrovich Zhdanov

After the severance of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began evacuating the population from the border areas, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and Northern Ladoga region. The bulk of the population gathered between November 29 and December 4.


Signal flares over the Soviet-Finnish border, the first month of the war.

The first stage of the war is usually considered to be the period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940. At this stage, the Red Army units were advancing in the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.

Main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 3/13/1940.

	USSR Finland	Beginning of negotiations on concluding a mutual assistance agreement
	Finland	General mobilization announced
		The formation of the 1st Corps of the Finnish People's Army (originally the 106th Mountain Division), which was staffed by Finns and Karelians, began. By November 26, the corps numbered 13,405 people. The corps did not participate in hostilities
	USSR Finland	Negotiations were interrupted and the Finnish delegation left Moscow
		The Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling, allegedly carried out from Finnish territory in the area of ​​​​the border village of Mainila, four Red Army soldiers were killed and eight were wounded
		Announcement of denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland
		Severance of diplomatic relations with Finland
		Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities
		Troops of the Leningrad Military District (Commander 2nd Rank Army Commander K. A. Meretskov, Member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov):
		7A attacked on the Karelian Isthmus (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 separate tank brigades, 13 artillery regiments; commander of the 2nd rank army commander V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - 2nd rank army commander Meretskov)
		8A (4 rifle divisions; division commander I. N. Khabarov, since January - 2nd rank army commander G. M. Stern) - north of Lake Ladoga in the Petrozavodsk direction
		9A (3rd infantry division; commander corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, from mid-December - corps commander V.I. Chuikov) - in central and northern Karelia
		14A (2nd infantry division; division commander V.A. Frolov) advanced into the Arctic
		The port of Petsamo has been taken in the Murmansk direction
		In the town of Terijoki, the so-called “People's Government” was formed from Finnish communists, headed by Otto Kuusinen
		The Soviet government signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the government of the “Finnish Democratic Republic” Kuusinen and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by Risto Ryti
		Troops 7A overcame the operational zone of barriers 25-65 km deep and reached the front edge of the main defense line of the Mannerheim Line.
		USSR expelled from the League of Nations
		The advance of the 44th Infantry Division from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi with the aim of providing assistance to the 163rd Division encircled by the Finns. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. On January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. Division commander, brigade commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar I.T. Pakhomenko and Chief of Staff A.I. Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning their troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment of 37 tanks, 79 guns, 280 machine guns, 150 cars, all radio stations, and the entire convoy on the battlefield. Most of the fighters died, 700 people escaped encirclement, 1200 surrendered. For cowardice, Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were shot in front of the division line
		The 7th Army is divided into 7A and 13A (commander corps commander V.D. Grendal, from March 2 - corps commander F.A. Parusinov), which were reinforced with troops
		The government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland
		Stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus
		The Finnish attack on units of the 7th Army was repulsed
		The North-Western Front was formed on the Karelian Isthmus (commander 1st Rank Army Commander S.K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council Zhdanov) consisting of 24 rifle divisions, a tank corps, 5 separate tank brigades, 21 artillery regiments, 23 air regiments: - 7A (12 rifle divisions, 7 artillery regiments of the RGK, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 10 air regiments) - 13A (9 rifle divisions, 6 artillery regiments of the RGK, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate battalions of heavy tanks, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments)
		A new 15A was formed from units of the 8th Army (commander of the 2nd rank army commander M.P. Kovalev)
		After the artillery barrage, the Red Army began to break through the main line of Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus
		The Summa fortified junction was taken
	Finland	Commander of the Karelian Isthmus troops in the Finnish army, Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman is suspended. Major General A.E. was appointed in his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps
		Units 7A reached the second line of defense
		7A and 13A began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay
		A bridgehead on the western shore of the Vyborg Bay was captured
	Finland	The Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of Viipuri (Vyborg)
		The 50th Corps cut the Vyborg-Antrea railway
	USSR Finland	Arrival of the Finnish delegation in Moscow
	USSR Finland	Conclusion of a peace treaty in Moscow. The Karelian Isthmus, the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala, Kuolajärvi, islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy Peninsula in the Arctic went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR. The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there. The Petsamo region, captured by the Red Army at the beginning of the war, has been returned to Finland. (The border established by this treaty is close to the border under the Treaty of Nystad with Sweden in 1721)
	USSR Finland	Storming of Vyborg by units of the Red Army. Cessation of hostilities

The group of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in northern and central Karelia, and the 14th Army in Petsamo.

Soviet tank T-28

The advance of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Army of the Isthmus (Kannaksenarmeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.

For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only “sketchy intelligence information about the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.” As a result, the allocated forces to break through the “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy bunkers. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense line, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.

Breakthrough attempts continued until the end of December, but were unsuccessful.

Scheme of military operations in December 1939 - January 1940

Scheme of the offensive of the Red Army in December 1939

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IVarmeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.

Juho Heiskanen

Some of the Soviet troops were surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.
The advance of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland task force (Pohjois-SuomenRyhm?) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army launched an offensive from White Sea Karelia. It penetrated the enemy defenses at 35–45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, attacking the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Front kitchen

Some researchers and memoirists try to explain the Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (up to? 40 ° C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observation data and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, On the Karelian Isthmus, temperatures ranged from +2 to -7 °C. Then until the New Year the temperature did not drop below 23 °C. Frosts of up to 40 °C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts hindered not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim also wrote about. There was also no deep snow before January 1940. Thus, operational reports of Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Destroyed Soviet T-26 tank

T-26

An unpleasant surprise was also the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail.” During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

Molotov cocktail from the Winter War

During the war, Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Radar "RUS-1"

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line (Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920-1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.

Name

The name “Mannerheim Line” appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish War in December 1939, when Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before this, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification work. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Jorma Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the start of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the structures.
History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, and construction itself continued intermittently until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939.
The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.
Work on the defense plan was continued by the German colonel Baron von Brandenstein. It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish combat engineer training battalion.
In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oskar Enckel. The main design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.
According to this plan, in 1920 - 1924, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built, of which 114 were machine gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.
The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They reached their greatest scale in 1932, when six double-embrasure bunkers were built under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabritius.

Fortifications
The main defensive line consisted of an elongated system of defense nodes, each of which included several wood-earth field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The defense nodes themselves were placed extremely unevenly on the main defensive line: the gaps between individual resistance nodes sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense node had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If counting is carried out from the shore of the Gulf of Finland, then the node designations will follow in this order: Bunker diagram

“N” – Khumaljoki [now Ermilovo] “K” – Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] “N” – Nyayukki [no existence]
“Ko” — Kolmikeeyalya [no noun] “Well” — Hyulkeyalya [no noun] “Ka” — Karkhula [now Dyatlovo]
“Sk” - Summakylä [non-creature] "La" - Lyahde [non-creature] "A" - Eyuräpää (Leipäsuo)
“Mi” – Muolaankylä [now Gribnoye] “Ma” – Sikniemi [no existential] “Ma” – Mälkelä [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [no noun] "No" - Noisniemi [now Mys] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Portovoye] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)

Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)

Dot SK16

Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive line. The fortification system also included a rear defensive line that covered the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense units:
"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct] "Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
"Nu" - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoye] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoye] "Le" - Leviainen [no existence]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Yulya-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
“Not” - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyyukylä [now Ozernoye]

Dot Ink5

The resistance center was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front the node occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and in depth 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine gun and artillery, which made up the skeleton of the defense.
Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication trench with forward machine gun nests and rifle cells for one to three riflemen.
The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and embrasures for firing. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line abutted the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
The basis for the fortifications was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered by large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and streams. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests there are rocky ridges and numerous large boulders everywhere. The Belgian general Badu wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia.”
Reinforced concrete structures of the “Mannerheim Line” are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and second generation (1938-1939).

A group of Red Army soldiers inspects an armored cap on a Finnish pillbox

The first generation bunkers were small, one-story, with one to three machine guns, and did not have shelters for the garrison or internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coating - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.

The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million-dollar” or million-dollar pillboxes, since the cost of each of them exceeded a million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, and obtained additional allocations from the country’s parliament. One of the most modern and heavily fortified bunkers were the Sj4 "Poppius", which had embrasures for flanking fire in the western casemate, and the Sj5 "Millionaire", with embrasures for flanking fire in both casemates. Both bunkers swept through the entire ravine with flanking fire, covering each other's front with machine guns. Flanking fire bunkers were called casemate “Le Bourget”, named after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread already during the First World War. Some bunkers in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into flanking fire casemates, while the front embrasure was bricked up. The bunkers of the flanking fire were well camouflaged with stones and snow, which made them difficult to detect; in addition, it was almost impossible to penetrate the casemate with artillery from the front. “Million-dollar” pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were guns, mainly of flanking action. The usual armament of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm guns of the 1900 model on Durlyakher casemate mountings and 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns of the 1936 model on casemate installations. Less common were 76-mm mountain guns of the 1904 model on pedestal mounts.

The weaknesses of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: inferior quality of concrete in first-term buildings, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, and lack of rigid reinforcement in first-term buildings.
The strengths of the pillboxes lay in the large number of fire embrasures that shot through the near and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, and in the rich filling of gaps.

Destroyed bunker

Engineering barriers
The main types of anti-personnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were somewhat different from the Soviet slingshots or the Bruno spiral. These anti-personnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank ones. The gouges were usually placed in four rows, two meters apart, in a checkerboard pattern. The rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with wire fences, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned into anti-personnel obstacles at the same time. The most powerful obstacles were at height 65.5 at pillbox No. 006 and on Khotinen at pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdubolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At pillbox No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high, embedded in concrete. The gouges in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the hole, it was necessary to go through 18 rows of wire under three or four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the front edge of the enemy’s defense. In some cases, the area between bunkers and pillboxes was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of a populated area and were made of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. If necessary, the Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of wire barriers along the main defense line. In practice, when in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive line and began to attempt to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of tests of anti-tank barriers for survivability using those then in service The Finnish army of several dozen outdated Renault light tanks turned out to be incompetent in the face of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the gouges moved from their place under the pressure of medium T-28 tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the gouges with explosive charges, thereby creating passages for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious drawback, undoubtedly, was a good overview of the lines of anti-tank ditches from distant enemy artillery positions, especially in open and flat areas, such as, for example, in the area of ​​​​the defense center "Sj" (Summa-yarvi), where it was on 11.02. 1940 The main defensive line was broken through. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the hollows were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.

Between the granite anti-tank gouges there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Rubble of stones, barbed wire and in the distance an SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).
Terijoki government
On December 1, 1939, a message was published in the Pravda newspaper stating that the so-called “People's Government” had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, Kuusinen’s government is usually called “Terijoki”, since after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.
On December 2, negotiations took place in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.
The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation to Finland was provided. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if one year before the expiration of the contract neither party declared its termination, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The agreement came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki.”
In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.
It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, was no longer governing the country. The USSR declared at the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENVIRONMENT OF VINTER

Accepted Comrade Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy Mr. Winter announced the desire of the so-called “Finnish government” to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called “Finnish government,” which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could now be no question of any negotiations with this “government.” The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen.

The “People's Government” was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that using in propaganda the fact of the creation of a “people's government” and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would influence the Finnish population, increasing the disintegration in the army and in the rear.
Finnish People's Army
On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the “Finnish People's Army” (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called “Ingria”, began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.
By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (made of khaki cloth and similar to the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a captured uniform of the Polish army , are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).
This “people’s” army was supposed to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the “people’s” government. “Finns” in confederate uniforms held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to begin the political and organizational work of communists (note: the word “communists” is crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power,” which indicated practical measures to create Popular Front in occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.
Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to carry out combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts from the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and the capture of Vyborg.
When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When Soviet-Finnish consultations on concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.

Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns citizens of the USSR

Foreign volunteers

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. The most significant number of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers there were also citizens of many other countries, including England and the USA, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the “Russian People's Detachments”, formed by the Finns from among captured Red Army soldiers. But since the work on forming such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in the hostilities.
Preparing for the offensive

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary to wage war in winter in Finland. By the end of December it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Divisions of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined areas and obstacles, methods of combating defensive structures were developed, and personnel were trained. To storm the “Mannerheim Line”, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military Council Zhdanov.

Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich

The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a huge amount of work was carried out on the hasty construction and re-equipment of communication routes for uninterrupted supply of the active army. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.
To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the first echelon divisions were assigned destruction artillery groups (AD) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, which had 81 guns with calibers of 203, 234, 280 mm.

203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931

Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line

During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland. [source not specified 198 days] Fought on the side of the Finns about 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries.


Finnish autonomous ski squads armed with machine guns

Finnish assault rifle M-31 “Suomi”

TTD “Suomi” M-31 Lahti

Cartridge used	9x19 Parabellum
Sighting line length
Barrel length
Weight without cartridges
Empty/loaded weight of 20-round box magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 36-round box magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 50-round box magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 40-round disc magazine
Empty/loaded weight of 71-round disc magazine
Rate of fire	700-800 rpm
Initial bullet speed
Sighting range	500 meters
Magazine capacity	20, 36, 50 rounds (box) 40, 71 (disc)

At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used guerrilla warfare tactics: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest where bases were established. Snipers caused heavy losses. According to the strong opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish ones), the greatest danger was posed by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from the trees. The Red Army formations that broke through were constantly surrounded and forced their way back, often abandoning their equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army, became widely known. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi to help the 163rd Division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but the division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment on the battlefield of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train. More than a thousand personnel who escaped the encirclement were wounded or frostbitten; some of the wounded were captured because they were not taken out during their escape. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division line.

On the Karelian Isthmus the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began careful preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, off the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 sank (probably hit a mine) under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov. S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

crew of the submarine "S-2"

Based on the Directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposelok of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goimae of the Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and were required to work in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus across the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Summa. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and fire from closed positions and mainly across areas, since target reconnaissance and adjustment were poorly established. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to achieve success.
On February 6, the attack on the Summa strip began. In the following days, the offensive front expanded both to the west and to the east.
On February 9, the commander of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.
On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.
Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa region were unsuccessful, the main attack was moved east, to the direction of Lyakhde. At this point, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery bombardment and Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.
During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the “Mannerheim Line”, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.
On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.
By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.
At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th Army - towards Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.


On March 13, troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.

England and France: plans for intervention

England provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, “we would have to fight one way or another.” The Finnish representative in London, Georg Achates Gripenberg, approached Halifax on December 1, 1939, asking for permission to ship war materials to Finland, on the condition that they would not be re-exported to Germany (with which England was at war). The head of the Northern Department, Laurence Collier, believed that British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while opposing, however, the use proposed by Finland Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Snow continued to support the idea of ​​​​an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), which he had expressed before the war. Amid government disagreements, the British Army began supplying weapons, including artillery and tanks, in December 1939 (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).
When Finland requested bombers to attack Moscow and Leningrad and to destroy the railway to Murmansk, the latter idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Northern Department: helping the Finns destroy the road would allow Britain to "avoid having to carry out the same operation later , independently and in less favorable conditions.” Maclean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with Maclean's reasoning and requested an additional supply of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.

According to Craig Gerrard, plans for intervention in the war against the USSR, which were formed in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war they were currently waging with Germany. By the beginning of 1940, the prevailing view in the Department of the North was that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that appeasement of the aggressors was wrong; Now the enemy, unlike his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains the position of MacLean and Collier not on ideological, but on humanitarian grounds.
Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that in “circles close to the government” there was a desire to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and send Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that at a conscious level the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to exchange one war for another, but from the assumption that the plans of Germany and the USSR were closely linked.
From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense because of the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany through a blockade. Soviet supplies of raw materials led to the fact that the German economy continued to grow and the realization that after some time this growth would make winning the war against Germany impossible. In this situation, although moving the war to Scandinavia posed a certain risk, the alternative was even worse inaction. The Chief of the French General Staff, Gamelin, ordered the planning of an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.
Great Britain did not support many French plans, including an attack on the oil fields in Baku, an attack on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was technically at war with the USSR). However, Britain was also moving closer to opening a second front against the USSR. On 5 February 1940, at a joint war council (at which Churchill was unusually present but not speaking) it was decided to seek Norwegian and Swedish consent to a British-led operation in which an expeditionary force would land in Norway and move east . As Finland's situation worsened, French plans became increasingly one-sided. So, in early March, Daladier, to the surprise of Great Britain, announced his readiness to send 50,000 soldiers and 100 bombers against the USSR if the Finns asked for it. The plans were canceled following the end of the war, to the relief of many involved in the planning.

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.
Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13.
Results of the war

For starting the war on December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations.
Also, a “moral embargo” was imposed on the USSR - a ban on the supply of aviation technologies from the United States, which negatively affected the development of the Soviet aviation industry, which traditionally used American engines.
Another negative result for the USSR was the confirmation of the weakness of the Red Army. According to the Soviet textbook on the history of the USSR, before the Finnish War, the military superiority of the USSR even over such a small country as Finland was not obvious; and European countries could count on Finland's victory over the USSR.
Although the victory of the Soviet troops (the pushed back border) showed that the USSR was no weaker than Finland, information about the losses of the USSR, significantly exceeding the Finnish ones, strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany.
The Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in winter, in wooded and swampy areas, experience in breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting an enemy using guerrilla warfare tactics.
All officially declared territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, “The war ended in 3 months and 12 days, only because our army did a good job, because our political boom set for Finland turned out to be correct.”
The USSR gained full control over the waters of Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).
In addition, according to the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build a railway on its territory connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.
The peace treaty also provided for the creation of a Soviet consulate in Mariehamn (Aland Islands), and the status of these islands as a demilitarized territory was confirmed.

Finnish citizens leave for Finland after the transfer of part of the territory to the USSR

Germany was bound by a treaty with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which it made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to test out possible changes. Relations were initially cool, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from the Western Allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently arranged for a meeting with Hermann Goering, the number two in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström at the end of the 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest.” Kivimäki immediately reported this to Helsinki.
The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; they also influenced Hitler's decision to attack the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis powers was called the “Continuation War” in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.

Territorial changes

1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to rapidly build fortifications along the new border (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
3.Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
4. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland.
5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
6.Rent of the Hanko Peninsula (Gangut) for 30 years.

Finland reoccupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War. In 1944, these territories again ceded to the USSR.
Finnish losses
Military
According to an official statement published in the Finnish press on May 23, 1940, the total irretrievable losses of the Finnish army during the war amounted to 19,576 killed and 3,263 missing. Total - 22,839 people.
According to modern calculations:
Killed - ok. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people)
Wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people)
Prisoners - 1000 people.
Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. out of approximately 250 thousand participants, that is, about 25%. Brief information about each of the victims on the Finnish side was published in a number of Finnish publications.
Civil
According to official Finnish data, during air raids and bombings of Finnish cities, 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1,300 slightly injured, 256 stone and about 1,800 wooden buildings were destroyed.

USSR losses

The official figures for Soviet casualties in the war were announced at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbitten.

Monument to those who fell in the Soviet-Finnish war (St. Petersburg, near the Military Medical Academy).

war memorial

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. This military conflict was preceded by long negotiations regarding the exchange of territories, which ultimately ended in failure. In the USSR and Russia, this war, for obvious reasons, remains in the shadow of the war with Germany that soon followed, but in Finland it is still the equivalent of our Great Patriotic War.

Although the war remains half-forgotten, no heroic films are made about it, books about it are relatively rare and it is poorly reflected in art (with the exception of the famous song “Accept us, Suomi Beauty”), there is still debate about the causes of this conflict. What did Stalin count on when starting this war? Did he want to Sovietize Finland or even incorporate it into the USSR as a separate union republic, or were his main goals the Karelian Isthmus and the security of Leningrad? Can the war be considered a success or, given the ratio of sides and the scale of losses, a failure?

Background

A propaganda poster from the war and a photo of a Red Army party meeting in the trenches. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In the second half of the 1930s, unusually active diplomatic negotiations took place in pre-war Europe. All major states were feverishly looking for allies, sensing the approach of a new war. The USSR did not stand aside either, which was forced to negotiate with the capitalists, who were considered the main enemies in Marxist dogma. In addition, events in Germany, where the Nazis came to power, an important part of whose ideology was anti-communism, pushed for active action. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Germany had been the main Soviet trading partner since the early 1920s, when both defeated Germany and the USSR found themselves in international isolation, which brought them closer.

In 1935, the USSR and France signed a mutual assistance treaty, clearly directed against Germany. It was planned as part of a more global Eastern Pact, according to which all Eastern European countries, including Germany, were to enter a single system of collective security, which would fix the existing status quo and make aggression against any of the participants impossible. However, the Germans did not want to tie their hands, the Poles also did not agree, so the pact remained only on paper.

In 1939, shortly before the end of the Franco-Soviet treaty, new negotiations began, to which Britain joined. The negotiations took place against the backdrop of aggressive actions by Germany, which had already taken part of Czechoslovakia, annexed Austria and, apparently, did not plan to stop there. The British and French planned to conclude an alliance treaty with the USSR to contain Hitler. At the same time, the Germans began to establish contacts with an offer to remain aloof from the future war. Stalin probably felt like a marriageable bride when a whole line of “grooms” lined up for him.

Stalin did not trust any of the potential allies, but the British and French wanted the USSR to fight on their side, which made Stalin fear that in the end it would be mainly only the USSR that would fight, and the Germans promised a whole bunch of gifts just for the USSR to stay aside, which was much more consistent with the aspirations of Stalin himself (let the damned capitalists fight each other).

In addition, negotiations with England and France reached a dead end due to the Poles’ refusal to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory in the event of war (which was inevitable in a European war). In the end, the USSR decided to stay out of the war, concluding a non-aggression pact with the Germans.

Negotiations with the Finns

Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from negotiations in Moscow. October 16, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

Against the background of all these diplomatic maneuvers, long negotiations with the Finns began. In 1938, the USSR invited the Finns to allow it to establish a military base on the island of Gogland. The Soviet side feared the possibility of a German attack from Finland and offered the Finns a mutual assistance agreement, and also gave guarantees that the USSR would stand up for Finland in the event of aggression from the Germans.

However, the Finns at that time adhered to strict neutrality (according to the laws in force, it was forbidden to join any unions and place military bases on their territory) and were afraid that such agreements would drag them into an unpleasant story or, what’s good, lead to war. Although the USSR offered to conclude an agreement secretly, so that no one would know about it, the Finns did not agree.

The second round of negotiations began in 1939. This time the USSR wanted to lease a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland to strengthen the defense of Leningrad from the sea. Negotiations also ended without results.

The third round began in October 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the outbreak of World War II, when all the leading European powers were distracted by the war and the USSR largely had a free hand. This time the USSR proposed to arrange an exchange of territories. In exchange for the Karelian Isthmus and a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the USSR offered to give up very large territories of Eastern Karelia, even larger in size than those given by the Finns.

True, it is worth considering one fact: the Karelian Isthmus was a very developed territory in terms of infrastructure, where the second largest Finnish city of Vyborg was located and a tenth of the Finnish population lived, but the lands offered by the USSR in Karelia were, although large, but completely undeveloped and there were no there was nothing but forest. So the exchange was, to put it mildly, not entirely equal.

The Finns agreed to give up the islands, but could not afford to give up the Karelian Isthmus, which not only was a developed territory with a large population, but also the Mannerheim defensive line was located there, around which the entire Finnish defensive strategy was based. The USSR, on the contrary, was primarily interested in the isthmus, since this would make it possible to move the border away from Leningrad by at least several tens of kilometers. At that time, there were about 30 kilometers between the Finnish border and the outskirts of Leningrad.

Maynila incident

In the photographs: a Suomi submachine gun and Soviet soldiers digging up a pillar at the Maynila border post, November 30, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

Negotiations ended without result on November 9. And on November 26, an incident occurred near the border village of Maynila, which was used as a pretext to start a war. According to the Soviet side, an artillery shell flew from Finnish territory to Soviet territory, which killed three Soviet soldiers and a commander.

Molotov immediately sent a threatening demand to the Finns to withdraw their troops from the border 20-25 kilometers. The Finns stated that, based on the results of the investigation, it turned out that no one from the Finnish side fired and, probably, we are talking about some kind of accident on the Soviet side. The Finns responded by inviting both sides to withdraw troops from the border and conduct a joint investigation of the incident.

The next day, Molotov sent a note to the Finns accusing them of treachery and hostility, and announced the termination of the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Two days later, diplomatic relations were severed and Soviet troops went on the offensive.

Currently, most researchers believe that the incident was organized by the Soviet side in order to obtain a casus belli for attacking Finland. In any case, it is clear that the incident was just a pretext.

War

In the photo: a Finnish machine gun crew and a propaganda poster from the war. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

The main direction for the attack of the Soviet troops was the Karelian Isthmus, which was protected by a line of fortifications. This was the most suitable direction for a massive attack, which also made it possible to use tanks, which the Red Army had in abundance. It was planned to break through the defenses with a powerful blow, capture Vyborg and head towards Helsinki. The secondary direction was Central Karelia, where massive military operations were complicated by the undeveloped territory. The third blow was delivered from the north.

The first month of the war was a real disaster for the Soviet army. She was disorganized, disoriented, chaos and misunderstanding of the situation reigned at the headquarters. On the Karelian Isthmus, the army managed to advance several kilometers in a month, after which the soldiers came up against the Mannerheim Line and were unable to overcome it, since the army simply did not have heavy artillery.

In Central Karelia everything was even worse. Local forests opened up wide scope for guerrilla tactics, for which the Soviet divisions were not prepared. Small detachments of Finns attacked columns of Soviet troops moving along the roads, after which they quickly left and hid in forest caches. Mining of roads was also actively used, as a result of which Soviet troops suffered significant losses.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Soviet troops had insufficient quantities of camouflage robes and the soldiers were a convenient target for Finnish snipers in winter conditions. At the same time, the Finns used camouflage, which made them invisible.

The 163rd Soviet division was advancing in the Karelian direction, whose task was to reach the city of Oulu, which would cut Finland in two. For the offensive, the shortest direction between the Soviet border and the shore of the Gulf of Bothnia was specially chosen. Near the village of Suomussalmi, the division was surrounded. Only the 44th Division, which had arrived at the front and was reinforced by a tank brigade, was sent to help her.

The 44th Division moved along the Raat road, stretching for 30 kilometers. After waiting for the division to stretch out, the Finns defeated the Soviet division, which had a significant numerical superiority. Barriers were placed on the road from the north and south, which blocked the division in a narrow and well-exposed area, after which, with the help of small detachments, the division was cut up on the road into several mini-“cauldrons”.

As a result, the division suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, frostbitten and prisoners, lost almost all its equipment and heavy weapons, and the division command, which escaped from the encirclement, was shot by the verdict of a Soviet tribunal. Soon several more divisions were surrounded in a similar way, which managed to escape from the encirclement, suffering huge losses and losing most of their equipment. The most notable example is the 18th Division, which was surrounded in South Lemetti. Only one and a half thousand people managed to escape from the encirclement, with the division's regular strength being 15 thousand. The division's command was also executed by a Soviet tribunal.

The offensive in Karelia failed. Only in the northern direction did Soviet troops act more or less successfully and were able to cut off the enemy from access to the Barents Sea.

Finnish Democratic Republic

Propaganda leaflets, Finland, 1940. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

Almost immediately after the start of the war, in the border town of Terijoki, occupied by the Red Army, the so-called the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, which consisted of high-ranking communist figures of Finnish nationality who lived in the USSR. The USSR immediately recognized this government as the only official one and even concluded a mutual assistance agreement with it, according to which all the pre-war demands of the USSR regarding the exchange of territories and the organization of military bases were fulfilled.

The formation of the Finnish People's Army also began, which was planned to include soldiers of Finnish and Karelian nationalities. However, during the retreat, the Finns evacuated all their inhabitants, and it had to be replenished from soldiers of the corresponding nationalities already serving in the Soviet army, of whom there were not very many.

At first, the government was often featured in the press, but failures on the battlefield and unexpectedly stubborn Finnish resistance led to a prolongation of the war, which was clearly not part of the original plans of the Soviet leadership. Since the end of December, the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic has been mentioned less and less in the press, and from mid-January they no longer remember it; the USSR again recognizes as the official government the one that remained in Helsinki.

End of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In January 1940, there were no active hostilities due to severe frosts. The Red Army brought heavy artillery to the Karelian Isthmus to overcome the defensive fortifications of the Finnish army.

At the beginning of February, the general offensive of the Soviet army began. This time it was accompanied by artillery preparation and was much better thought out, which made the task easier for the attackers. By the end of the month, the first few lines of defense were broken, and at the beginning of March, Soviet troops approached Vyborg.

The Finns' initial plan was to hold off Soviet troops for as long as possible and wait for help from England and France. However, no help came from them. Under these conditions, further continuation of resistance was fraught with loss of independence, so the Finns entered into negotiations.

On March 12, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, which satisfied almost all the pre-war demands of the Soviet side.

What did Stalin want to achieve?

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

There is still no clear answer to the question of what Stalin’s goals were in this war. Was he really interested in moving the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad a hundred kilometers, or was he counting on the Sovietization of Finland? The first version is supported by the fact that in the peace treaty Stalin placed the main emphasis on this. The second version is supported by the creation of the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic headed by Otto Kuusinen.

Disputes about this have been ongoing for almost 80 years, but most likely, Stalin had both a minimum program, which included only territorial demands for the purpose of moving the border from Leningrad, and a maximum program, which provided for the Sovietization of Finland in case of a favorable combination of circumstances. However, the maximum program was quickly withdrawn due to the unfavorable course of the war. In addition to the fact that the Finns stubbornly resisted, they also evacuated the civilian population in the areas of the Soviet army's advance, and Soviet propagandists had practically no opportunity to work with the Finnish population.

Stalin himself explained the need for war in April 1940 at a meeting with the commanders of the Red Army: “Did the government and the party act correctly in declaring war on Finland? Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally. There, in the West, the three greatest powers were at each other's throats; when to decide the question of Leningrad, if not in such conditions, when our hands are full and we are presented with a favorable situation in order to strike them at this moment”?

Results of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

The USSR achieved most of its goals, but it came at a great cost. The USSR suffered huge losses, significantly greater than the Finnish army. Figures in various sources differ (about 100 thousand killed, died from wounds and frostbite and missing), but everyone agrees that the Soviet army lost a significantly larger number of soldiers killed, missing and frostbite than the Finnish one.

The prestige of the Red Army was undermined. By the beginning of the war, the huge Soviet army not only outnumbered the Finnish one many times over, but was also much better armed. The Red Army had three times more artillery, 9 times more aircraft and 88 times more tanks. At the same time, the Red Army not only failed to take full advantage of its advantages, but also suffered a number of crushing defeats at the initial stage of the war.

The progress of the fighting was closely followed in both Germany and Britain, and they were surprised by the inept actions of the army. It is believed that it was as a result of the war with Finland that Hitler was finally convinced that an attack on the USSR was possible, since the Red Army was extremely weak on the battlefield. In Britain they also decided that the army was weakened by the purges of officers and were glad that they did not drag the USSR into allied relations.

Reasons for failure

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org, © wikimedia.org

In Soviet times, the main failures of the army were associated with the Mannerheim Line, which was so well fortified that it was practically impregnable. However, in reality this was a very big exaggeration. A significant part of the defensive line consisted of wood-earth fortifications or old structures made of low-quality concrete that had become obsolete over 20 years.

On the eve of the war, the defensive line was fortified with several “million-dollar” pillboxes (so they were called because the construction of each fortification cost a million Finnish marks), but it was still not impregnable. As practice has shown, with proper preparation and support from aviation and artillery, even a much more advanced line of defense can be broken through, as happened with the French Maginot Line.

In fact, the failures were explained by a number of blunders of the command, both top and people on the ground:

1. underestimating the enemy. The Soviet command was confident that the Finns would not even bring it to war and would accept Soviet demands. And when the war began, the USSR was sure that victory would be a matter of a few weeks. The Red Army had too great an advantage in both personal strength and firepower;

2. disorganization of the army. The command structure of the Red Army was largely changed a year before the war as a result of massive purges in the ranks of the military. Some of the new commanders simply did not meet the necessary requirements, but even talented commanders had not yet had time to gain experience in commanding large military units. Confusion and chaos reigned in the units, especially in the conditions of the outbreak of war;

3. insufficient elaboration of offensive plans. The USSR was in a hurry to quickly resolve the issue with the Finnish border while Germany, France and Britain were still fighting in the West, so preparations for the offensive were carried out in a hurry. The Soviet plan included delivering the main attack along the Mannerheim Line, while there was virtually no intelligence information along the line. The troops had only extremely rough and sketchy plans for defensive fortifications, and later it turned out that they did not correspond to reality at all. In fact, the first assaults on the line took place blindly; in addition, light artillery did not cause serious damage to the defensive fortifications and to destroy them it was necessary to bring up heavy howitzers, which at first were practically absent from the advancing troops. Under these conditions, all assault attempts resulted in huge losses. Only in January 1940 did normal preparations for the breakthrough begin: assault groups were formed to suppress and capture firing points, aviation was involved in photographing the fortifications, which made it possible to finally obtain plans for the defensive lines and develop a competent breakthrough plan;

4. The Red Army was not sufficiently prepared to conduct combat operations in specific terrain in winter. There was not a sufficient number of camouflage robes, and there was not even warm clothing. All this stuff lay in warehouses and began to arrive in units only in the second half of December, when it became clear that the war was beginning to become protracted. At the beginning of the war, the Red Army did not have a single unit of combat skiers, which were used with great success by the Finns. Submachine guns, which turned out to be very effective in rough terrain, were generally absent in the Red Army. Shortly before the war, the PPD (Degtyarev submachine gun) was withdrawn from service, since it was planned to replace it with more modern and advanced weapons, but the new weapon was never received, and the old PPD went into warehouses;

5. The Finns took advantage of all the advantages of the terrain with great success. Soviet divisions, stuffed to the brim with equipment, were forced to move along roads and were practically unable to operate in the forest. The Finns, who had almost no equipment, waited until the clumsy Soviet divisions stretched along the road for several kilometers and, blocking the road, launched simultaneous attacks in several directions at once, cutting the divisions into separate parts. Trapped in a narrow space, Soviet soldiers became easy targets for Finnish squads of skiers and snipers. It was possible to escape from the encirclement, but this led to huge losses of equipment that had to be abandoned on the road;

6. The Finns used scorched earth tactics, but they did it competently. The entire population was evacuated in advance from the areas that were to be occupied by units of the Red Army, all property was also taken away, and empty settlements were destroyed or mined. This had a demoralizing effect on Soviet soldiers, to whom propaganda explained that they were going to liberate their brother workers and peasants from the unbearable oppression and abuse of the Finnish White Guards, but instead of crowds of joyful peasants and workers welcoming the liberators, they encountered only ashes and mined ruins.

However, despite all the shortcomings, the Red Army demonstrated the ability to improve and learn from its own mistakes as the war progressed. The unsuccessful start of the war contributed to the fact that they got down to business as normal, and in the second stage the army became much more organized and effective. At the same time, some mistakes were repeated again a year later, when the war with Germany began, which also went extremely poorly in the first months.

Evgeniy Antonyuk
Historian

Of all the wars that Russia has waged throughout history, the Karelian-Finnish war of 1939-1940. remained the least advertised for a long time. This is due both to the unsatisfactory outcome of the war and to significant losses.

It is still not known for certain how many combatants on both sides died in the Finnish war.

Soviet-Finnish war, soldiers' march to the front

When the Soviet-Finnish war, started by the country's leadership, took place, the whole world took up arms against the USSR, which in fact turned into colossal foreign policy problems for the country. Next, we will try to explain why the war could not end quickly and turned out to be a failure overall.

Finland has almost never been an independent state. In the period from the 12th to the 19th centuries it was under Swedish rule, and in 1809 it became part of the Russian Empire.

However, after the February Revolution, unrest began in Finland; the population first demanded broad autonomy, and then completely came to the idea of ​​independence. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

The Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

However, the further path of development of the country was not clear-cut; a civil war broke out in the country between whites and reds. Even after the victory of the White Finns, there were still many communists and social democrats in the country's parliament, half of whom were eventually arrested, and half were forced to hide in Soviet Russia.

Finland supported a number of White Guard forces during the Russian Civil War. Between 1918 and 1921, several military conflicts occurred between the countries - two Soviet-Finnish wars, after which the final border between the states was formed.

Political map of Europe during the interwar period and the border of Finland before 1939

In general, the conflict with Soviet Russia was resolved and until 1939 the countries lived in peace. However, on the detailed map, the territory that belonged to Finland after the Second Soviet-Finnish War is highlighted in yellow. The USSR claimed this territory.

Finnish border before 1939 on the map

The main causes of the Finnish War of 1939:

• Until 1939, the USSR border with Finland was located only 30 km away. from Leningrad. In case of war, the city could be located under shelling from the territory of another state;
• historically the lands in question were not always part of Finland. These territories were part of the Principality of Novgorod, then were captured by Sweden, and recaptured by Russia during the Northern War. Only in the 19th century, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, were these territories transferred to them for management. Which, in principle, was not of fundamental importance within the framework of a single state;
• The USSR needed to strengthen its position in the Baltic Sea.

In addition, despite the absence of war, the countries had a number of claims against each other. Many communists were killed and arrested in Finland in 1918, and a number of Finnish communists found refuge in the USSR. On the other hand, many Finns suffered during the political terror in the Soviet Union.

this year a large number of communists were killed and arrested in Finland

In addition, local border conflicts between countries regularly took place. Just as the Soviet Union was not satisfied with such a border near the second largest city in the RSFSR, not all Finns were satisfied with the territory of Finland.

In some circles, the idea of ​​​​creating a “Greater Finland” that would unite the majority of Finno-Ugric peoples was considered.

Thus, there were enough reasons for the Finnish war to start, when there were a lot of territorial disputes and mutual discontent. And after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, Finland moved into the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Therefore, in October 1939, negotiations began between the two sides - the USSR demanded to cede the territory bordering Leningrad - to move the border at least 70 km.

Negotiations between the two countries begin in October this year

In addition, we are talking about the transfer of several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the lease of the Hanko Peninsula, and the transfer of Fort Ino. In exchange, Finland is offered a territory twice as large in area in Karelia.

But despite the idea of ​​a “Greater Finland”, the deal looks extremely unfavorable for the Finnish side:

• firstly, the territories offered to the country are sparsely populated and practically devoid of infrastructure;
• secondly, the territories to be taken away are already inhabited by the Finnish population;
• finally, such concessions would both deprive the country of a line of defense on land and seriously weaken its position at sea.

Therefore, despite the length of the negotiations, the parties did not come to a mutually beneficial agreement and the USSR began preparations for an offensive operation. The Soviet-Finnish war, the start date of which was secretly discussed in the highest circles of the political leadership of the USSR, increasingly appeared in Western news headlines.

The causes of the Soviet-Finnish war are briefly outlined in archival publications of that era.

Briefly about the balance of forces and means in the winter war

As of the end of November 1939, the balance of forces on the Soviet-Finnish border is presented in the table.

As you can see, the superiority of the Soviet side was colossal: 1.4 to 1 in numbers of troops, 2 to 1 in guns, 58 to 1 in tanks, 10 to 1 in aircraft, 13 to 1 in ships. Despite careful preparation, the start of the Finnish war (the date of the invasion had already been agreed upon with the political leadership of the country) occurred spontaneously; the command did not even create a front.

They wanted to fight the war using the Leningrad Military District.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

First of all, the USSR creates a pretext for the Soviet-Finnish war - it organizes a border conflict at Mainila on November 26, 1939 (the first date of the Finnish war). There are many versions describing the reasons for the start of the Finnish War of 1939, but the official version of the Soviet side:

The Finns attacked the border outpost, 3 people were killed.

The documents disclosed in our time that describe the war between the USSR and Finland in 1939-1940 are contradictory, but do not contain clear evidence of an attack by the Finnish side.

Then the Soviet Union forms the so-called. Kuusinen's government, which heads the newly formed Finnish Democratic Republic.

It is this government that recognizes the USSR (no other country in the world has recognized it) and responds to the request to send troops into the country and support the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois government.

From that time until the peace negotiations, the USSR did not recognize the democratic government of Finland and did not negotiate with it. War has not even been officially declared - the USSR sent troops to assist a friendly government in an internal civil war.

Otto V. Kuusinen, head of the Finnish government in 1939

Kuusinen himself was an old Bolshevik - he was one of the leaders of the Red Finns in the Civil War. He fled the country in time, headed the international for some time, and even escaped repression during the Great Terror, although it primarily fell on the old guard of the Bolsheviks.

Kuusinen's coming to power in Finland would be comparable to the coming to power in the USSR in 1939 of one of the leaders of the white movement. It is doubtful that major arrests and executions could have been avoided.

However, the fighting is not going as well as planned by the Soviet side.

Hard war of 1939

The initial plan (developed by Shaposhnikov) included a kind of “blitzkrieg” - the capture of Finland was to be carried out within a short period of time. According to the plans of the General Staff:

The war in 1939 was supposed to last 3 weeks.

It was supposed to break through the defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and make a breakthrough with tank forces to Helsinki.

Despite the significant superiority of Soviet forces, this basic offensive plan failed. The most significant advantage (in tanks) was offset by natural conditions - tanks simply could not make free maneuvers in forest and swampy conditions.

In addition, the Finns quickly learned to destroy Soviet tanks that were not yet sufficiently armored (they used mainly T-28s).

It was during the Finnish war with Russia that an incendiary mixture in a bottle and a wick got its name - the Molotov cocktail. The original name was “Cocktail FOR Molotov”. Soviet tanks simply burned out upon contact with the combustible mixture.

The reason for this was not only low-level armor, but also gasoline engines. This incendiary mixture was no less terrible for ordinary soldiers.

The Soviet army also turned out, surprisingly, to be unprepared for war in winter conditions. Ordinary soldiers were equipped with ordinary Budenovkas and overcoats, which did not protect them from the cold. On the other hand, if it were necessary to fight in the summer, the Red Army would be faced with even greater problems, for example, impassable swamps.

The offensive that began on the Karelian Isthmus was not prepared for heavy fighting on the Mannerheim Line. In general, the military leadership did not have clear ideas about this line of fortifications.

Therefore, the artillery shelling at the first stage of the war was ineffective - the Finns simply waited out it in fortified bunkers. In addition, ammunition for the guns took a long time to be delivered - the weak infrastructure affected it.

Let us dwell in more detail on the Mannerheim line.

1939 - war with Finland on the Mannerheim Line

Since the 1920s, the Finns have been actively building a series of defensive fortifications, named after a prominent military leader of 1918-1921. - Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Realizing that a possible military threat to the country does not come from the north and west, it was decided to build a powerful defensive line in the southeast, i.e. on the Karelian Isthmus.

Karl Mannerheim, the military leader after whom the front line is named

We should pay tribute to the designers - the topography of the territory made it possible to actively use natural conditions - numerous dense forests, lakes, and swamps. The key structure was the Enkel bunker - a standard concrete structure armed with machine guns.

At the same time, despite the long construction time, the line was not at all as impregnable as it would later be called in numerous textbooks. Most of the pillboxes were created according to Enkel's design, i.e. early 1920s These were outdated at the time of the Second World War for several people, with 1-3 machine guns, without underground barracks.

In the early 1930s, million-dollar pillboxes were designed and began to be built in 1937. Their fortification was stronger, the number of embrasures reached six, and there were underground barracks.

However, only 7 such pillboxes were built. It was not possible to build up the entire Mannerheim line (135 km) with pillboxes, because before the war, certain sections were mined and surrounded by wire fences.

On the front, instead of pillboxes, there were simple trenches.

This line should not be neglected either; its depth ranged from 24 to 85 kilometers. It was not possible to break through it at once - for some time the line saved the country. As a result, on December 27, the Red Army stopped its offensive operations and prepared for a new assault, bringing up artillery and retraining soldiers.

The further course of the war will show that with proper preparation, the outdated line of defense could not hold out for the required time and save Finland from defeat.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

The first stage of the war also saw the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations (12/14/1939). Yes, at that time this organization lost its significance. The exclusion itself was more likely a consequence of increased antipathy towards the USSR throughout the world.

England and France (at that time not yet occupied by Germany) provide Finland with various assistance - they do not enter into an open conflict, but there are active supplies of weapons to the northern country.

England and France are developing two plans to help Finland.

The first involves the transfer of military corps to Finland, and the second involves the bombing of Soviet fields in Baku. However, the war with Germany forces us to abandon these plans.

Moreover, the expeditionary force would have to pass through Norway and Sweden, to which both countries responded with a categorical refusal, wanting to maintain their neutrality in World War II.

Second stage of the war

Since the end of December 1939, a regrouping of Soviet troops has been taking place. A separate North-Western Front is formed. Armed forces are being built up on all sectors of the front.

By the beginning of February 1940, the number of armed forces reached 1.3 million people, guns - 3.5 thousand. Airplanes - 1.5 thousand. Finland by that time was also able to strengthen the army, including through the help of other countries and foreign volunteers, but the balance of forces became even more catastrophic for the defending side.

On February 1, a massive artillery bombardment of the Mannerheim Line began. It turns out that most Finnish pillboxes cannot withstand accurate and prolonged shelling. They bomb for 10 days just in case. As a result, when the Red Army attacked on February 10, instead of bunkers, it found only many “Karelian monuments.”

In winter, on February 11, the Mannerheim Line was broken, Finnish counter-offensives lead to nothing. And on February 13, the second line of defense, hastily strengthened by the Finns, breaks through. And already on February 15, taking advantage of the weather conditions, Mannerheim gave the order for a general retreat.

Help for Finland from other countries

It should be noted that breaking through the Mannerheim Line meant the end of the war and even defeat in it. There was practically no hope for major military assistance from the West.

Yes, during the war, not only England and France provided Finland with various technical assistance. Scandinavian countries, the USA, Hungary and a number of others sent many volunteers to the country.

soldiers were sent to the front from Sweden

At the same time, it was the threat of direct war with England and France, in the event of a complete capture of Finland, that forced I. Stalin to negotiate with the current Finnish government and make peace.

The request was transmitted through the USSR Ambassador to Sweden to the Finnish Ambassador.

The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"

Let us dwell separately on the well-known military myth about Finnish snipers - the so-called. cuckoos During the Winter War (as it is called in Finland), many Soviet officers and soldiers fell victims to Finnish snipers. A story began to circulate among the troops that Finnish snipers were hiding in the trees and firing from there.

However, sniper fire from trees is extremely ineffective, since a sniper in a tree himself represents an excellent target and does not have a proper foothold and the ability to quickly retreat.

The answer to such accuracy of snipers is quite simple. At the beginning of the war, the officers were equipped with insulated sheepskin coats of a dark color, which were clearly visible in the snowy desert and stood out against the background of the soldiers' greatcoats.

The fire was fired from insulated and camouflaged positions on the ground. Snipers could sit in improvised shelters for hours, waiting for a suitable target.

The most famous Finnish sniper of the Winter War is Simo Häyhä, who shot about 500 Red Army officers and soldiers. At the end of the war, he received a serious injury to his jaw (it had to be inserted from the femur), but the soldier lived to be 96 years old.

The Soviet-Finnish border was moved 120 kilometers from Leningrad - Vyborg, the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were annexed.

A 30-year lease for the Hanko Peninsula was agreed upon. In return, Finland received only the Petsamo region, which provided access to the Barents Sea and was rich in nickel ores.

The completion of the Soviet-Finnish war brought bonuses to the winner in the form of:

1. USSR acquisition of new territories. They managed to move the border away from Leningrad.
2. Gaining combat experience, awareness of the need to improve military equipment.
3. Colossal battle losses. Data vary, but the average death toll was over 150 thousand people (125 from the USSR and 25 thousand from Finland). Sanitary losses were even greater - 265 thousand in the USSR and over 40 thousand in Finland. These figures had a discrediting effect on the Red Army.
4. Plan failure for the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic .
5. Decline in international authority. This applies to both the countries of the future allies and the Axis countries. It is believed that it was after the Winter War that A. Hitler finally became convinced that the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay.
6. Finland lost territories that are important to them. The area of ​​given land was 10% of the entire territory of the country. The spirit of revanchism began to grow in her. From a neutral position, the country increasingly gravitates toward supporting the Axis countries and ultimately participates in the Great Patriotic War on the side of Germany (in the period 1941-1944).

Summarizing all of the above, we can conclude that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 was a strategic failure of the Soviet leadership.

(see the beginning in the previous 3 publications)

73 years ago, one of the most unpublicized wars in which our state took part ended. The Soviet-Finnish War of 1940, also called the “Winter”, cost our state very dearly. According to the lists of names compiled by the personnel apparatus of the Red Army already in 1949-1951, the total number of irretrievable losses amounted to 126,875 people. The Finnish side in this conflict lost 26,662 people. Thus, the loss ratio is 1 to 5, which clearly indicates the low quality of management, weapons and skills of the Red Army. However, despite such a high level of losses, the Red Army completed all its tasks, albeit with certain adjustments.

So at the initial stage of this war, the Soviet government was confident of an early victory and the complete capture of Finland. It was based on such prospects that the Soviet authorities formed the “government of the Finnish Democratic Republic” headed by Otto Kuusinen, a former deputy of the Finnish Sejm, a delegate of the Second International. However, as military operations progressed, appetites had to be reduced, and instead of the premiership of Finland, Kuusinen received the post of chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the newly formed Karelian-Finnish SSR, which existed until 1956, and remained the head of the Supreme Council of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Despite the fact that the entire territory of Finland was never conquered by Soviet troops, the USSR received significant territorial gains. From the new territories and the already existing Karelian Autonomous Republic, the sixteenth republic within the USSR was formed - the Karelo-Finnish SSR.

The stumbling block and the reason for the start of the war - the Soviet-Finnish border in the Leningrad region was moved back 150 kilometers. The entire northern coast of Lake Ladoga became part of the Soviet Union, and this body of water became internal for the USSR. In addition, part of Lapland and islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland went to the USSR. The Hanko Peninsula, which was a kind of key to the Gulf of Finland, was leased to the USSR for 30 years. The Soviet naval base on this peninsula existed at the beginning of December 1941. On June 25, 1941, three days after the attack by Nazi Germany, Finland declared war on the USSR and on the same day Finnish troops began military operations against the Soviet garrison of Hanko. The defense of this territory continued until December 2, 1941. Currently, the Hanko Peninsula belongs to Finland. During the Winter War, Soviet troops occupied the Pechenga region, which before the 1917 revolution was part of the Arkhangelsk region. After the area was transferred to Finland in 1920, large reserves of nickel were discovered there. The development of the deposits was carried out by French, Canadian and British companies. Largely due to the fact that the nickel mines were controlled by Western capital, in order to maintain good relations with France and Great Britain following the Finnish War, this site was transferred back to Finland. In 1944, after the completion of the Petsamo-Kirkines operation, Pechenga was occupied by Soviet troops and subsequently became part of the Murmansk region.

The Finns fought selflessly and the result of their resistance was not only large losses of Red Army personnel, but also significant losses of military equipment. The Red Army lost 640 aircraft, the Finns knocked out 1,800 tanks - and all this despite the complete dominance of Soviet aviation in the air and the virtual absence of anti-tank artillery among the Finns. However, no matter what exotic methods of fighting Soviet tanks the Finnish troops came up with, luck was on the side of the “large battalions”.

The whole hope of the Finnish leadership lay in the formula “The West will help us.” However, even the closest neighbors provided Finland with rather symbolic assistance. 8 thousand untrained volunteers arrived from Sweden, but at the same time Sweden refused to allow 20 thousand interned Polish soldiers through its territory, ready to fight on the side of Finland. Norway was represented by 725 volunteers, and 800 Danes also intended to fight against the USSR. Hitler also tripped up Mannerheim again: the Nazi leader banned the transit of equipment and people through the territory of the Reich. A couple of thousand volunteers (though of advanced age) arrived from Great Britain. A total of 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, which could not seriously affect the balance of power.

In addition, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations should have brought moral satisfaction to the Finnish side. However, this international organization was only a pathetic forerunner of the modern UN. In total, it included 58 states, and in different years, for various reasons, countries such as Argentina (withdrew in the period 1921-1933), Brazil (withdrew in 1926), Romania (withdrew in 1940), Czechoslovakia (membership terminated March 15, 1939), and so on. In general, one gets the impression that the countries participating in the League of Nations did nothing but enter or leave it. The exclusion of the Soviet Union as an aggressor was especially actively advocated by such countries “close” to Europe as Argentina, Uruguay and Colombia, but Finland’s closest neighbors: Denmark, Sweden and Norway, on the contrary, stated that they would not support any sanctions against the USSR. Not being any serious international institution, the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946 and, ironically, the chairman of the Swedish Storing (parliament) Hambro, the same one who had to read out the decision to exclude the USSR, at the final assembly of the League of Nations announced a greeting to the founding countries of the UN , among which were the Soviet Union, still headed by Joseph Stalin.

Supplies of weapons and ammunition to Philland from European countries were paid for in specie, and at inflated prices, which Mannerheim himself admitted. In the Soviet-Finnish war, profits were made by the concerns of France (which at the same time managed to sell weapons to Hitler’s promising ally Romania), and Great Britain, which sold frankly outdated weapons to the Finns. An obvious opponent of the Anglo-French allies, Italy sold Finland 30 aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. Hungary, which then fought on the side of the Axis, sold anti-aircraft guns, mortars and grenades, and Belgium, which a short time later fell under German attack, sold ammunition. Its closest neighbor, Sweden, sold Finland 85 anti-tank guns, half a million rounds of ammunition, gasoline, and 104 anti-aircraft weapons. Finnish soldiers fought in overcoats made from cloth purchased in Sweden. Some of these purchases were paid for with a $30 million loan provided by the United States. What is most interesting is that most of the equipment arrived “at the end” and did not have time to take part in hostilities during the Winter War, but, apparently, it was successfully used by Finland already during the Great Patriotic War in alliance with Nazi Germany.

In general, one gets the impression that at that time (winter of 1939-1940) the leading European powers: neither France nor Great Britain had yet decided with whom they would have to fight in the next few years. In any case, the head of the British Department of the North, Laurencollier, believed that the goals of Germany and Great Britain in this war could be common, and according to eyewitnesses - judging by the French newspapers of that winter, it seemed that France was at war with the Soviet Union, and not with Germany. The joint British-French War Council decided on February 5, 1940 to appeal to the governments of Norway and Sweden with a request to provide Norwegian territory for the landing of the British Expeditionary Force. But even the British were surprised by the statement of French Prime Minister Daladier, who unilaterally announced that his country was ready to send 50 thousand soldiers and a hundred bombers to help Finland. By the way, plans for waging war against the USSR, which at that time was assessed by the British and French as a significant supplier of strategic raw materials to Germany, developed even after the signing of peace between Finland and the USSR. Back on March 8, 1940, a few days before the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee developed a memorandum that described the future military actions of the British-French allies against the USSR. Combat operations were planned on a wide scale: in the north in the Pechenga-Petsamo region, in the Murmansk direction, in the Arkhangelsk region, in the Far East and in the southern direction - in the area of ​​Baku, Grozny and Batumi. In these plans, the USSR was considered as a strategic ally of Hitler, supplying him with strategic raw materials - oil. According to the French General Weygand, the strike should have been carried out in June-July 1940. But by the end of April 1940, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain admitted that the Soviet Union adheres to strict neutrality and there is no reason for an attack. In addition, already in June 1940, German tanks entered Paris, and it was then that the joint French-British plans were captured by Hitler's troops.

However, all these plans remained only on paper and for more than a hundred days of the Soviet-Finnish war, no significant assistance was provided by the Western powers. Actually, Finland was put in a hopeless situation during the war by its closest neighbors - Sweden and Norway. On the one hand, the Swedes and Norwegians verbally expressed all their support for the Finns, allowing their volunteers to participate in hostilities on the side of the Finnish troops, but on the other hand, these countries blocked a decision that could actually change the course of the war. The Swedish and Norwegian governments refused the request of the Western powers to provide their territory for the transit of military personnel and military cargo, and otherwise the Western expeditionary force would not have been able to arrive at the theater of operations.

By the way, Finland’s military expenditures in the pre-war period were calculated precisely on the basis of possible Western military assistance. Fortifications on the Mannerheim Line in the period 1932 - 1939 were not at all the main item of Finnish military spending. The vast majority of them were completed by 1932, and in the subsequent period the gigantic (in relative terms it amounted to 25 percent of the entire Finnish budget) Finnish military budget was directed, for example, to such things as the massive construction of military bases, warehouses and airfields. Thus, Finnish military airfields could accommodate ten times more aircraft than were in service with the Finnish Air Force at that time. It is obvious that the entire Finnish military infrastructure was being prepared for foreign expeditionary forces. What is characteristic is that the massive filling of Finnish warehouses with British and French military equipment began after the end of the Winter War, and all this mass of goods, almost in full, subsequently fell into the hands of Nazi Germany.

The actual military operations of the Soviet troops began only after the Soviet leadership received guarantees from Great Britain of non-interference in the future Soviet-Finnish conflict. Thus, the fate of Finland in the Winter War was predetermined by precisely this position of the Western allies. The United States has taken a similar two-faced position. Despite the fact that the American Ambassador to the USSR Steinhardt literally went into hysterics, demanding that sanctions be imposed against the Soviet Union, expel Soviet citizens from US territory and close the Panama Canal to the passage of our ships, US President Franklin Roosevelt limited himself to only introducing a “moral embargo.”

The English historian E. Hughes generally described the support of France and Great Britain for Finland at a time when these countries were already at war with Germany as “the product of a madhouse.” One gets the impression that Western countries were even ready to enter into an alliance with Hitler only so that the Wehrmacht would lead the West’s crusade against the USSR. French Prime Minister Daladier, speaking in parliament after the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, said that the results of the Winter War were a disgrace for France, and “a great victory” for Russia.

The events and military conflicts of the late 1930s in which the Soviet Union participated became episodes of history in which the USSR for the first time began to act as a subject of international politics. Before this, our country was viewed as a “terrible child”, an unviable freak, a temporary misunderstanding. Nor should we overestimate the economic potential of Soviet Russia. In 1931, Stalin, at a conference of industrial workers, said that the USSR was 50-100 years behind developed countries and that this distance must be covered by our country in ten years: “Either we do this, or we will be crushed.” The Soviet Union failed to completely eliminate the technological gap by 1941, but it was no longer possible to crush us. As the USSR industrialized, it gradually began to show its teeth to the Western community, beginning to defend its own interests, including through armed means. Throughout the late 1930s, the USSR carried out the restoration of territorial losses that resulted from the collapse of the Russian Empire. The Soviet government methodically pushed state borders further and further beyond the West. Many acquisitions were made almost bloodlessly, mainly by diplomatic methods, but moving the border from Leningrad cost our army many thousands of soldiers' lives. However, such a transfer was largely predetermined by the fact that during the Great Patriotic War, the German army got stuck in the Russian open spaces and in the end Nazi Germany was defeated.

After almost half a century of constant wars, as a result of the Second World War, relations between our countries normalized. The Finnish people and their government realized that it was better for their country to act as a mediator between the worlds of capitalism and socialism, and not to be a bargaining chip in the geopolitical games of world leaders. And even more so, Finnish society has ceased to feel like the vanguard of the Western world, called upon to contain the “communist hell.” This position has led to Finland becoming one of the most prosperous and rapidly developing European countries.