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Second Punic War 218-201 BC. Battles of the Second Punic War in Italy

ANCIENT WORLD HISTORY:
East, Greece, Rome/
I.A.Ladynin and others.
M.: Eksmo, 2004

Section II

The rise of slavery in Italy.
Creation of the Roman Mediterranean Power
(III-I centuries BC)

Chapter V

The struggle of Rome with Carthage (264-201 BC)

5.5. Second Punic
or Hannibal, war (218-201 BC)

Carthage quickly recovered from its defeat in the First Punic War. At the head of the military party, which sought revenge, was the capable commander and experienced diplomat Hamilcar Barca. He understood that due to the vulnerability of North Africa, almost devoid of fortresses (with the exception of Carthage and Utica), success in the fight against Rome could only be achieved in Italy. In turn, in Italy, the weakest link in the Roman defense was objectively Cisalpine Gaul, whose tribes were ready to support any enemies of Rome. Hamilcar decided to make Iberia a springboard for the invasion of Northern Italy.

In 237 BC. e. Hamilcar Barca began the conquest of Iberia. Here he encountered fierce resistance from local tribes. At the cost of enormous efforts, he managed to conquer the southwestern part of the peninsula, rich in silver mines, but in 229 BC. e. he died, leaving a strong army as a legacy to his successors. Hamilcar was succeeded by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who founded the city of New Carthage (modern Cartagena) and advanced to the Iber River (modern Ebro). This river, according to the treaty of 226 BC. e., concluded by Hasdrubal with Rome, became the northern border of the Carthaginian possessions in Iberia.

In 221 BC. e. Hasdrubal died. After his death, the Carthaginian army proclaimed 26-year-old Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barca, as their leader. From his father, Hannibal inherited not only the outstanding talent of a commander, but also an irreconcilable hatred of Rome. Forcing the development of events, in 219 BC. e. he besieged and stormed Saguntum, a city on the eastern coast of Iberia, which was an ally of Rome. This event became the reason for the start of the second war between Rome and Carthage.

In 218 BC. e. Hannibal, having concluded treaties of alliance with the Boii and Insubres, at the head of an army of almost 90 thousand, reinforced by 37 elephants, began a campaign in Italy. While the Roman Senate showed strange inaction, the Carthaginian army, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the local tribes, crossed northern Iberia, crossed the Pyrenees, with the help of weapons, gold or diplomacy, safely passed southern Gaul and reached the Western Alps. Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio failed to stop the enemy's advance on the distant approaches to Northern Italy. In the fall of 218 BC. Hannibal's troops, having passed the Alpine gorges in 15 days, unhinderedly descended into the valley. The losses of the Carthaginians were enormous: Hannibal had only 20 thousand infantry, 6 thousand cavalry and several elephants left. However, he soon increased the size of his army by 64 thousand people at the expense of the Gauls who rebelled against Rome.

In the winter of 218 BC. e. in two fierce battles near the rivers Ticinus and Trebia (modern Ticino and Trebbia), Hannibal defeated the troops of both consuls, Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus, and became ruler of Northern Italy. He hoped to win over the Italians, dissatisfied with Roman rule. A serious threat loomed over Rome. In the spring of 217 BC. e. consul Gaius Flaminius Nepos, in the recent past the conqueror of the Gauls and leader of the Roman plebs, planned to prevent the enemy from crossing the Apennines; when this failed, he, without waiting for the second consular army, rushed to catch up with the enemy who had bypassed him, but as a result of Hannibal’s skillful maneuver he was trapped, ambushed on a narrow road between the mountains and Lake Trasimene. The Romans were defeated, losing 30 thousand people killed and captured; Flaminius himself also died (June 217 BC). Having captured Etruria, Hannibal headed to Southern Italy.

In conditions of extreme danger, a dictator was elected in Rome - the old and experienced Quintus Fabius Maximus. He chose the most appropriate tactic in the current situation - avoiding a decisive battle, following on the enemy’s heels, wearing him down in small skirmishes, depriving him of food and fodder. Thanks to this course of action, there were no loud victories, but there were no defeats either. Meanwhile, Hannibal failed to rouse the Italians to revolt against Rome. His situation gradually worsened. However, Fabius's cautious tactics, which did not interfere with the devastation of Italy, aroused discontent among wide sections of Roman citizenship. The old dictator was accused of indecision, mediocrity and even cowardice, and was called “Uncle Hannibal.” The unflattering nickname Kunktator (“Slower”) stuck to him.

At the end of his term of office, Fabius resigned and returned to Rome, and command passed to the consuls of 216 BC. e. Gaius Terence Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus. At the beginning of August 216 BC. e. a huge Roman army (80 thousand infantry and 6 thousand cavalry) met Hannibal's army (40 thousand infantry and 10 thousand cavalry) on a plain near the town of Cannae in Apulia. The cautious Aemilius Paulus tried to keep his arrogant colleague from battle, but Varro insisted on his own and led the troops out of the camp. The Roman infantry lined up in a huge quadrangle 70 rows deep, with cavalry covering the flanks. Hannibal formed his infantry in a crescent shape, arched towards the enemy. In the center stood 20 thousand Gauls and Iberians - relatively weak and unreliable troops. Selected units of the Libyans were located along the edges of the crescent. In front were light infantry units, on the flanks were units of heavy Gallic-Iberian and light Numidian cavalry.

At first, the Romans, as one would expect, began to strongly press the enemy center, as a result of which the crescent “bent”, enveloping the enemy formation with its edges, and the Roman infantry was gradually drawn into the bag. At the same time, Hannibal's numerous cavalry, scattering the Roman cavalry, struck the Romans in the rear. Soon the ring closed, the ranks of the Roman army were mixed, and the merciless beating of the surrounded Romans began. The dead bodies of 54 thousand legionnaires, 80 senators and 25 senior commanders remained on the battlefield, along with the consul Aemilius Paulus (his son-in-law, Scipio Africanus, was destined to defeat Hannibal after 14 years, and his grandson, Scipio Aemilianus, was destined to destroy Carthage after another 56 years) . Varro fled, 18 thousand Romans were captured. The Carthaginians lost only 5.7 thousand people. The brilliant victory of Hannibal remained for centuries a classic example of military art, and the word “Cannes” became a household word. The path to Rome was open for Hannibal.

However, the Carthaginian commander did not move to Rome, but to Campania. Meanwhile, the anti-Roman coalition under the auspices of Carthage included the Macedonian king Philip V and some Greek cities of Sicily, led by Syracuse.

In conditions when the very existence of the Roman state was called into question, the Senate took decisive measures to continue the fight. As a result of the total mobilization of all men capable of bearing arms, a new army was formed, and even criminals and 8 thousand slaves bought at state expense had to be included in its composition. Through diplomacy, the Romans managed to neutralize the threat to Italy from Philip V, whose forces were pinned down in Greece by hostilities with the Aetolians and their allies (First Macedonian War, 215-205 BC). The Roman troops were led by five-time consuls, experienced commanders Quintus Fabius Maximus and Marcus Claudius Marcellus. They relied on a long war, designed to exhaust the enemy.

The fighting took place on three fronts: in Italy, Sicily and Iberia. Gradually, Hannibal found himself cut off from his main bases, his army was melting away. The fight went on with varying degrees of success. In 214-212 BC. Hannibal inflicted a number of sensitive blows on the Romans. In turn, the Romans in the fall of 212 BC. e. besieged and captured Capua, Hannibal's stronghold in Italy, which immediately brought his army to the brink of disaster. Hannibal's demonstrative campaign against Rome ended in complete failure. In the same 212 BC. e. After a two-year siege, Marcellus captured Syracuse. As a result, the Romans took control of Sicily, thereby cutting off Hannibal's communications with Carthage. Finally, in Iberia, Publius Cornelius Scipio (son of the consul of the same name in 218 BC, who died there, in Iberia, in 211 BC) in 209 BC. e. captured the enemy's main stronghold, New Carthage, and the following year defeated Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, in the Battle of Becula. In 206 BC. e. At Ilipus, Scipio inflicted a decisive defeat on the Carthaginians. As a result, Carthage lost Iberia. In 207 BC. e. Hasdrubal, who came to Italy to help his brother, was finally defeated and died in the Battle of Metaurus, and Hannibal was securely blocked in southern Italy.

In this situation, the Senate considered it timely to send an expeditionary army to Africa, led by Scipio, who had returned from Iberia. In 204 BC. e. Scipio landed on the African coast. The Carthaginian government soon recalled Hannibal from Italy (after his 15-year stay there) to defend the mother country. Scipio in 203 BC e. inflicted a crushing defeat on the Carthaginians and their ally, the Moorish king Sifak, and the following year met with Hannibal himself. At the Battle of Zama (202 BC), the Numidian cavalry fought on the side of the Romans. At the height of the battle, she bypassed the battle formations of the Carthaginian infantry and struck them in the rear. So, 14 years later, the situation of the battle at Cannes repeated itself, only now the Carthaginians found themselves in the role of the defeated side.

16. Second Punic War or the war with Hannibal.

(218...201 BC).

a) Conquest of Saguntum and campaign in Italy.

During the last Gallic war, the Romans did not lose sight of Carthage. Since their humiliation, the Carthaginians, in order to compensate for the losses caused by their loss of the islands, tried to find new auxiliary sources in Spain and acquire extensive possessions there. The country's wealth in precious metals once attracted the self-interested Phoenicians there, and now attracted the attention of their enterprising descendants - the Carthaginians. The main organizer of these conquests was the brave Hamilcar Barca. He conquered all the cities and tribes along the Betis River (now Guadalquivir) and along the Anasu River (now Guadiana) and, after an eight-year war, died in a battle with a Spanish mountain tribe (in 228). After Hamilcar's death, his son-in-law Gazdrubal continued his conquests. The Spaniards, not without some education, defended themselves courageously, and those of them who lived in the fortified city of Saguntum, believed to be an ancient colony of the Greek island of Zakynthos (Saguntum was located almost on the site of modern Madrid), turned to the Romans for help. The envy of Rome awoke, and the Roman ambassadors immediately went to Spain and forced Hasdrubal to sign a treaty, according to which he was obliged to recognize the Iber River as his border and was deprived of the right to extend his conquests beyond this river. An alliance treaty was concluded with Saguntum. Founded by Gazdrubal, New Carthage (now Cartagena), with an excellent harbor, became the main city and gathering place for the troops of Carthaginian Spain.

Gazdrubal died at the hands of an assassin in 221. The army chose the son of Hamilcar Barca, 28-year-old Hannibal, as its commander. Like his father, he harbored a terrible hatred for the Romans. When Hannibal was still a nine-year-old boy, his father Hamilcar forced him to swear an oath before the altar of Jupiter that he would harbor eternal hatred of the Romans. No one kept his oath as sacredly as Hannibal. This was a truly outstanding personality. The courage of a genius shone in his fiery gaze, his noble facial features spoke of cold-blooded prudence, his voice and gait spoke of the innate dignity of a ruler. He never lost his presence of mind in any danger, no work could tire him. Insensitive to heat and cold, indifferent to pleasures, not accustomed to a measured way of life, ready to sacrifice sleep and rest at any time, he demanded incredible work from his soldiers. He often slept between his bodyguards on the bare ground in one cloak. He dressed the same as the other warriors, only his weapon and horse were conspicuous. Hannibal was the first in battle and the last to leave the battlefield. With one glance, with one encouraging exclamation, he lifted the spirits of the tired warriors. With the insight of a great commander, he immediately saw and turned to his advantage the weaknesses and miscalculations of the enemy. At the same time, he was an outstanding statesman. In his heroic personality, the people saw their most worthy representative, and on the other hand, the army revered him as their idol.

The goal not realized by his father - to take revenge on the mortal enemy of the fatherland, the Romans - became the life motto of this ardent patriot. After Carthaginian power was firmly established in Spain, the army was properly trained and Carthage was financially strong enough, Hannibal decided that the time of reckoning had come.

Hannibal

He boldly crossed the border drawn by Roman envy and attacked the rich, well-fortified city of Saguntum. The Romans, having learned about this, sent envoys to Hannibal so that they would draw his attention to the consequences that could be caused by his hostile actions towards Rome, but the city of Saguntum itself was left to the mercy of fate. After an eight-month siege, Saguntum fell, despite the fact that it defended itself very courageously. Its inhabitants were sold into slavery, the booty captured in the city was partly sent to Carthage, partly used for military needs. Then the Roman embassy came to Carthage and demanded the extradition of the daring commander. After a lengthy debate in the Carthaginian Senate, which did not lead to a definite decision, the ambassadors very decisively declared: “We are talking about war or peace. Choose!” In response there were shouts: “Choose for yourself!” Then one of the ambassadors spoke, loosened his toga and announced that Rome was choosing war.

Thus began one of the greatest wars in world history in terms of its consequences. The talk here was no longer about the conquest of this or that territory, but about existence itself, about world domination or the final death of one of the warring parties, about the victory of either Greco-Roman or Phoenician-Semitic culture in the West.

With 770,000 inhabitants of Italy capable of bearing arms (such was its population according to Polybius), numerical superiority was ensured in advance. In order to somewhat equalize in this regard, Hannibal adopted a plan to move straight to Italy, where he could count on the support of the defeated, but warlike Gauls breathing vengeance. Numerous Numidian cavalry and a whole herd of elephants should have terrified the Romans. The Romans expected the appearance of an enemy fleet and, for their part, intended to land in Africa. But they could in no way predict Hannibal’s plans and did not suspect in him the energy with which he would carry them out. Therefore, the Romans calmly and leisurely prepared for war. Two consular troops of two legions each were created. With one of them, the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus was supposed to cross from Sicily to Africa, with the other, P. Cornelius Scipio intended to attack Hannibal in Spain.

At the beginning of 218, Hannibal set out from New Carthage. His army consisted of 90,000 infantry, 2,000 horsemen and 37 elephants. He conquered hostile tribes between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, which cost him 20,000 men. He then placed 10,000 at the disposal of his brother Hasdrubal to defend the conquered country. Hannibal sent 10,000 unreliable troops to Africa. Thus he was left with only 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry with a corresponding number of elephants. With these forces, Hannibal crossed the Pyrenees without encountering resistance there, crossed the Rodan (Rhone) river on hastily put together rafts and boats and gave the consul Cornelius Scipio, who hastily arrived here from Massilia, a minor cavalry battle. The Roman commander still did not guess Hannibal's plans; he did not consider it possible that Hannibal would dare to undertake such a grandiose event as crossing the Alps. Thus, Hannibal managed to make significant progress before the Romans realized his intention.

That he faced numerous difficulties both from nature and from the local inhabitants, Hannibal was no doubt aware, and therefore it must be assumed that such a cautious commander as he undertook the crossing of the Alps only after a careful study of local conditions and after get acquainted with the mood of local residents. But such foresight does not in the least detract from our admiration for such a grandiose military enterprise. Imagine the sons of sultry Africa and radiant Spain, burdened with weapons and luggage, climbing mountain peaks covered with eternal ice. Imagine horses, elephants, led along rocky cliffs covered with snow and ice, which, often stumbling, fell into the abyss, dragging their leaders with them. Imagine impassable roads, not marked on any maps, mountains inhabited by tribes of wild barbarians, with whom you constantly have to fight and who had the advantage of knowing the terrain. Imagine, finally, the time of year - the end of October - at which, even in our days, when roads are built in these mountains, a rare traveler will decide to cross them.

After a nine-day ascent, several thousand people and most of the pack animals died from hunger, cold, disease, and wounds. This was the price paid by Hannibal for the capture of the Petit Saint Bernard Pass, located on the south side of Mont Blanc. Here, at the pass, before beginning the descent into the valley, the tired army was given a two-day rest. Hannibal consoled the pale, exhausted, numb warriors, pointing to the luxurious Italian valleys stretching far below.

The descent from the mountains turned out to be even more difficult than the ascent. The snow that had just fallen made it difficult to navigate the area; people and animals again fell into the abyss. Hundreds of soldiers died under avalanches that fell from the mountains. According to Livy, Hannibal ordered fires to be built on the cliffs and thus melted the ice that covered them. The difficult descent lasted fifteen days and, finally, the army reached the Ivrean Valley. Here, the completely exhausted warriors were given a fifteen-day rest. The army was reduced by almost half, because out of 50,000 infantry and 9,000 horsemen, only 20,000 infantry, several elephants and 6,000 cavalry remained. The loss was made up for by the Gallic tribes friendly to Hannibal.

b) Ticinus, Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannes.

(218...216 BC).

Having received news of the enemy's invasion of Italy, the Romans immediately recalled both of their consuls from Massilia and Sicily and moved them to Upper Italy against Hannibal. Scipio met him on the Ticinus River. The Gallic tribe living in this area remained neutral. The Gauls wanted to wait for the moment when it became clear which side luck was leaning towards. Realizing the importance of this first battle, Hannibal inspired the warriors with a fiery speech. Then he quickly attacked the enemy. It was primarily a cavalry battle, in which the Numidian horsemen brought victory to Hannibal. Scipio was seriously wounded and was only saved with difficulty by his son. The remnants of the defeated army retreated across the Po River to Plancentia and fortified themselves here on the Trebia River. After this battle, 2,000 Gauls, having killed their Roman commanders, immediately went over to the side of Hannibal.

Soon after this affair, the second consul Sempronius arrived with his army at the port of Arimin, landed on the shore and, having crossed the Aemilium road to the Trebia River, united here with the remnants of Scipio's army. The army assembled in this way consisted of 40,000 people. Scipio, who was still suffering from his wound and preferred to act with extreme prudence, was of the opinion that battle with Hannibal should, if possible, be abstained from. But Sempronius, who wanted to take advantage of his comrade’s illness for his own glory and earn himself a triumph, insisted on giving Hannibal battle.

Hannibal was just waiting for this. He also persuaded the consul to make this decision with his alleged carelessness. The terrain and weather favored the Carthaginians. To lure the enemy, Hannibal sent the Numidians across the river. The trick was a success. Sempronius immediately ordered 4,000 horsemen and all the infantry to leave the camp, without even allowing the people to eat properly. The Numidian horsemen retreated on purpose, and very soon Sempronius found himself in a trap. It was the time of the winter solstice. A cold and foggy day ended with a heavy snowstorm. At night, the Trebia rose so high that the water reached the chests of the soldiers crossing it. Numb from the cold, exhausted from hunger, they reached the opposite bank and came across Hannibal’s well-armed and well-rested army, which was waiting for them, numbering 20,000 infantry and 10,000 horsemen with elephants with them. Thus, from the very beginning of the battle the forces were unequal. In addition, Hannibal's brother Mago, who was in ambush with 2,000 people, went to the rear of the Romans. As a result of these circumstances, the Battle of Trebia turned into a decisive defeat for the Romans. The Roman army was almost all destroyed. All the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul went over to Hannibal's side. He now settled in safe winter quarters and allowed his soldiers to make full use of the warehouses taken from the Romans, from which provisions were stocked in abundance. These stores, located west of Plancentia, in the city of Klastilis, fell into the hands of Hannibal due to the betrayal of the Latin commander.

All of Italy was horrified by the actions of the terrible enemy. In Rome, they were in a hurry to gather new troops and occupy the areas of the allies so that, out of fear, they could not follow the example of the Gauls. They tried to inspire courage in the people with stories about the favorable signs of the gods, and both new consuls, Prince. Servilius and C. Flaminius were sent with new troops at the beginning of the next year against the advancing Hannibal.

This latter, soon after the end of the rainy season, set out on a campaign and headed to Etruria through the Apennines. Crossing them was even more difficult than crossing the Alps, because the overflowing Arno River turned the entire country into a series of swamps. For three days and three nights, Hannibal’s soldiers had to walk knee-deep in water. Horses lost their shoes, pack animals got stuck in the mud, and Hannibal himself lost one eye from inflammation. But as soon as he got out onto dry soil, he immediately forced the consul Flaminius to enter into battle with him. Flaminius was already approaching a fortified camp, where he would be protected from both unexpected and regular attacks. But he allowed himself to be lured into an ambush. Hannibal settled on the heights near Lake Trasimene. When the next morning the consul, having set out from Arretium, continued his movement and stretched his army in a long line along a narrow road between the lake and the hills, he was suddenly attacked by Hannibal. In the thick fog, the Romans did not notice that Hannibal was standing at the exit of a mountain valley and that the heights were occupied by enemy troops. The enemy rushed at the Romans from all sides. The massacre that took place was terrible. Flaminius himself fell at the head of his brave men. Many warriors were thrown into the lake, where they drowned, others were cut down in droves by the Numidian cavalry. Only about 6,000 people rushed to the nearest city. But even here they were overtaken by the Numidian cavalry under the command of Magarbal, to whom they were forced to surrender. The Roman army was completely destroyed. On the contrary, Hannibal lost only 1,500 people, mostly Gauls.

By evening, terrible news reached Rome. Praetor Marcus Pomponius came to the podium and announced in a loud voice: “We have lost a great battle, our army has been exterminated, consul Flaminius has been killed.” A terrible despair took possession of everyone. Only the Senate retained its presence of mind and thought about only one thing - how to protect the capital from the mortal danger approaching it. The bridges on the Tiber were removed and the walls were put in a defensive position. But first of all, the popular assembly elected a dictator (the election of the dictator by law belonged to the consul, but there was no one in the city at that time), who was hoped that he could save the city from danger. The choice fell on Kv. Fabius Maximus, one of the descendants of the Fabian family who fought during the Samnite wars. Marcus Manutius was appointed commander of his cavalry.

Now more than ever, unity, caution and firmness were required in taking general measures. Sq. Fabius Maximus seemed to personify the ideal of prudence. Having made abundant sacrifices and prayers to propitiate the gods, which he considered his first duty, he recruited two new legions and added to them the remaining two consuls of Servilius.

Hannibal had too few siege engines at his disposal, and his army was weakened by the losses suffered, so he could not think about conquering such a huge city as Rome. As a result, it seemed much more useful to him to enlist the assistance of all allies and, above all, the Sabella tribes, in the very heart of Italy. To achieve this goal, leaving the capital on his right, Hannibal went along the shore of the Adriatic Sea to Lower Italy. He passed through the regions of the Marsi, Marrucins and Peligni, but everywhere he met unshakable loyalty to Rome - not a single city opened its gates to him voluntarily. He was already in Apulia when he met with the army of the dictator Fabius. Fabius, fully aware of what he now had to risk, avoided in every possible way the battle that Hannibal sought. Fabius carefully followed on his heels, leading his army along the heights, did not lose sight of him and did not engage him in battle. This apparently cowardly behavior was unpleasant both to Fabius's own soldiers and to Hannibal, and Fabius often heard ridicule from his soldiers. He alone could not be deceived by either these ridicule or the enemy’s military cunning. Hannibal went to Campania, to Capua, Fabius went there too. Hannibal went back to Apulia - the annoying observer did not lag behind him a single step. Under Kazilin, he blocked the Punams' path and even almost captured them. Hannibal suddenly saw himself locked in a valley and surrounded on all sides by the Romans standing on the mountains. He could only escape by cunning. On the very first night, Hannibal drove several hundred bulls to the Roman outposts, with burning bundles of brushwood tied to their horns. The Romans, imagining in their first fear that an enemy army was moving towards them with flaming brands in their hands, and seeing flames everywhere, did not know which way to turn to defend themselves. Hannibal took advantage of the general confusion and, unnoticed, left the trap laid for him. Only the next morning Fabius saw how cleverly Hannibal had deceived him.

Fabius's army continued its observational movement with greater and greater displeasure and gave its leader the mocking nickname of the cunctator, that is, the procrastinator.

Even in Rome itself, the seemingly timid military actions of the dictator were not at all prudent, although they had to admit that only thanks to his skill and prudence Rome received enough time to recover from the terrible defeat at Lake Trasimene. Hannibal, for his part, helped to arouse the distrust of the Romans against Fabius. To do this, passing by the estates of Fabius, with calculated cunning, he forbade them to be robbed. Hannibal's plan was a success. The Romans suspected that there was a secret agreement between him and the dictator. At the suggestion of one of the people's tribunes, they granted Fabius's commander of the cavalry, the boastful Minucius Rufus, who had recently won a slight advantage over the enemy, equal military power with Fabius. Fabius divided the army with Minucius so that he could do whatever he wanted with his part. As soon as Minucius became free from dependence, he immediately left the heights and fell into the ambush Hannibal had prepared for him. Minucius would not have saved a single person if Fabius had not come to his aid. Seeing Fabius approaching, Hannibal retreated, saying: “At last this cloud, which constantly hung over the mountains, burst into a thunderstorm over us.”

The conduct of Minucius after his deliverance deserves praise. Ashamed, he recognized the great prudence of Fabius, placed honorary signs of his dignity in front of his tent, called him father and savior, modestly returned his powers to the dictator and no longer sought the title of chief military commander.

The winter from 217 to 216 passed without incidents worthy of attention: Both troops, watching each other, tried to increase their strength in order to move on to decisive action in the spring of 216. In Rome, Fabius' way of conducting war was recognized as the only correct one in the current situation, but they believed that things could not go on like this for long. Care had to be taken to relieve as much as possible the allies, who were already beginning to lose patience with the scourge of war that was weighing on them. Therefore, it was decided to take offensive action. Four new legions were raised and added to the existing four, and the strength of each of these eight was increased to 5,000 infantry and 300 horsemen. Allied troops were added to them, and thus the total number of Roman troops reached 80,000 infantry and 6,000 horsemen. Therefore, the Romans hoped that numerical superiority would balance the military abilities, experience and self-confidence of Hannibal's troops, in which they were superior to the Roman troops. Unfortunately, the bad custom still persisted, according to which both consuls took turns commanding the troops every other day, which made the overall leadership of military operations extremely difficult and even almost impossible.

The two troops took up a position opposite each other near Cannes on the Aufida River, the most significant of the coastal rivers flowing into the Adriatic Sea. The Roman army was commanded by their two consuls: the not very capable but boastful plebeian Terence Varro and the prudent and cautious patrician Aemilius Paulus. Hannibal without the slightest delay entered into the battle proposed to him by Varro. Hannibal's army consisted of 40,000 infantry and 10,000 horsemen. He himself and his brother Mago positioned themselves in the center so as to be able to monitor the progress of the battle. Hannibal placed the Spanish and Gallic infantry in the middle in a semicircle, to the right of it he placed the Africans under the command of Hanno, and to the left opposite the Roman cavalry he placed Hasdrubal with the Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry. The Spaniards were dressed in white cloaks with red lapels and armed with short Spanish swords, which could be used to stab and chop with equal ease. The attack of the heavy Carthaginian cavalry immediately forced the cavalry, consisting of Roman citizens, to retreat. She was persecuted and almost all exterminated. The Carthaginian horsemen, going to the rear of the Roman infantry, rushed at the cavalry of the Roman allies, who were fighting with the Numidian horsemen. Thus, the allies were defeated. Leaving the pursuit to the Numidians, Gazdrubal struck with all his might into the rear of the Roman infantry, in which many soldiers had no combat experience. True, the Roman legions pushed back the enemy center and crashed like a wedge into the Carthaginian ranks. But at that moment Africans rushed at them from right and left, and heavy Spanish and Gallic cavalry fell to the rear. The Carthaginian center, which was already beginning to give in, stopped and began the battle again. Thus the Roman infantry was surrounded and squeezed on all sides. A terrible massacre began. Roman soldiers were killed like a flock of sheep. The Romans lost about 70,000 people killed and wounded in this battle. Among the dead was the consul Aemilius Paulus, who did not seek salvation in flight, as well as 21 tribunes of the people and 80 senators. Varro with 70 horsemen escaped to Venusia. The Roman camp was also captured and plundered. Hannibal lost only 6,000 people, including 200 horsemen.

The news of this terrible defeat created a literally stupefying and overwhelming impression in Rome. Many noble young men, overcome by despair, fled to Canusium, wanting to board a ship and leave their fatherland. Then young P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of Scipio, defeated at the Ticinus River, stepped among them and, drawing his sword, threatened to stab anyone who did not swear to remain faithful to the fatherland to the last drop of blood. In Rome, women rushed into the square, screaming and with their hair down, as if their own lives were already in danger. It was completely different with men. Both praetors immediately convened the Senate. It was here, and not somewhere else, that the true spirit of the Romans should have emerged. The aged Fabius surpassed everyone in this regard. He was the first to come up with prudent advice and, first of all, indicated the means to calm the people as quickly as possible. On his advice, the Senate ordered the city gates to be locked to prevent the escape of the faint-hearted. Women were forbidden to loudly express their complaints, run aimlessly through the streets and collect information about the actual scale of the disaster. Then the senators went around the houses and reassured the fathers of families. The elderly Fabius, with his usual calm appearance, walked through the streets and encouraged the citizens with dignified speeches. A Senate resolution was adopted according to which none of those killed at Cannae were allowed to mourn for more than thirty days. Consul Terence Varro was recalled to Rome, and in his place, as a prudent commander and already proven praetor, M. Claudius Marcellus was sent to Canusium, who escaped in this city with 10,000 fugitives. When the ill-fated commander returned to Rome, rightly fearing insults and reproaches from his fellow citizens, the full Senate came out to meet him and publicly thanked him for not despairing of saving the state. It was also decided that the Roman soldiers captured at Cannae should not be ransomed, for “a Roman soldier must either win or die.” And when, after all this, Hannibal, through Carthalon, whom he had sent, made peace proposals, Carthalon was not only not allowed into the city, but they also told him outside the city limits that there could be no talk of peace until the enemy cleared Italy. This heroic firmness and unanimity saved the state and even compensated for the terrible losses that the Romans had already suffered for three years. Almost all of Lower Italy could be considered lost to the Romans. The powerful Capua, which had the opportunity to field 30,000 infantry and 4,000 horsemen, fell away, despite the efforts of Decius Magius, the leader of the aristocratic party favored by the Romans. Subsequently, Hannibal ordered him to be captured and taken to Carthage. But the ship drifted to Cyrene, and Magius made his way from here to Alexandria to King Ptolemy, who set him free. The example of Capua was followed by the Samnites and Lucans. Brundisium, Venusia and Pest with their predominantly Latin population, as well as nearby Naples, Cumae, Nola and Nuceria, remained loyal to the Romans. Thus, after the battle of Cannae, the powerful people were limited to the same small area as they had occupied before the Samnite wars.

To replenish the decline in the Roman troops, the newly elected dictator M. Junius had to recruit from the youngest citizens capable of bearing arms - 17-year-olds. However, this measure turned out to be insufficient and it was necessary to arm the slaves, of whom there were quite a significant number at that time. They did not retreat even before releasing the criminals from prison and arming them. Thus, 8,000 slaves and 6,000 criminals joined the ranks of the army along with full Roman citizens and allies.

c) Hannibal in Lower Italy. War in Spain. Marcellus in Syracuse.

After the victory at Cannae, Hannibal, it would seem, should have marched his army directly to Rome, but instead he chose to head to Lower Italy. The question of why the great commander made such a decision has been discussed many times in both ancient and modern times, and the fact that he did not undertake an immediate campaign against Rome seemed an unforgivable mistake on his part. Livy puts into the mouth of the leader of the Carthaginian cavalry Magarbal the following words addressed to Hannibal on the day of the battle of Cannae: “You know what you have gained by this victory: in five days you will feast in the Capitol as a winner. Follow me! I will hasten forward with the cavalry in order to notify of my arrival before my appearance.” When Hannibal expressed his opinion on this subject, Magarbal said: “Truly, the gods do not endow one person with all talents. You know how to win, Hannibal, but you don’t know how to use victory.” To this Livy adds that almost everyone thought that Hannibal’s delay on that day saved both Rome and the entire state.

Mommsen and Ine find that Hannibal did the right thing by refusing to immediately march on Rome. Mommsen expresses himself approximately as follows: “Hannibal knew Rome better than naive people of ancient and modern times, who believed that he could solve the war with one move towards the enemy capital. Only modern military art decides war on the battlefield. It was completely different in ancient times, when offensive warfare against fortresses was much less developed than the defensive system. In those days, actions in the field, even with immeasurably greater consequences, would have crashed against the walls of the capital. Based on what considerations could it be assumed that Rome would have handed over the keys to the winner or even accepted peace on similar terms? Thus, instead of such demonstrations leading nowhere, Hannibal, in order not to miss possible and important results for their sake, immediately went to Capua and forced this second capital of Italy, after much hesitation, to come over to his side. Ine makes the following conclusion: “Rome was not at all an open city, but on the contrary, thanks to its position and art, it was strongly fortified. Every Roman resident, up to and including sixty-year-old elders, was ready to come out to defend the walls. Thus, even in this case, even if there were no reserve nearby - which, however, Hannibal should not have counted on - Rome was still protected from a surprise attack. Hannibal was too weak for a proper siege. Under no circumstances were his troops sufficient to surround the huge city and cut off the supply of provisions and the approach of reinforcements. What could a direct movement towards Rome lead to, even if it were not accompanied by any danger? It was therefore much more important to reap the sure benefits of acquiring fortresses in Lower Italy and a new line of operations, which he had never had since his exit from Cisalpine Gaul.

For Hannibal, in the current situation, it was important first of all to join the Roman allies. After the Battle of Cannae, the Capuans concluded an agreement with Hannibal, which in the future ensured them complete independence, freedom from military service and taxes, and over time gave them the opportunity to hope to achieve dominance over Italy.

Hannibal, although he had now taken possession of Lower Italy, was not yet strong enough to dare to strike a decisive blow. Although Mago managed to insist in Carthage on the decision to send 4,000 Numidian horsemen and 40 elephants to Italy to reinforce Hannibal, and to gather 20,000 infantry and 4,000 horsemen in Spain, these latter could only be sent from Spain to Italy by land, since by sea The Romans dominated. The Romans could prevent the arrival of auxiliary troops for a long time, and such a delay should have led to the worst consequences for Hannibal. Military operations in Lower Italy gradually became sluggish. Matters no longer came to major battles; the war was limited to a number of minor skirmishes aimed at capturing one or another fortified place. Roman historians also say, and of course in an exaggerated form, that as a result of their stay in luxurious Capua, Hannibal’s soldiers became pampered, and discipline between them fell. In the end, Hannibal almost didn’t know what new promises to reassure them with. Therefore Livia says: “Capua turned into Cannes for Hannibal.”

Meanwhile, in Spain the state of affairs at this time could not have been more favorable for the Romans. Both brothers Publius and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio fought here from 217 against Hasdrubal between the Pyrenees and the Ebro River. When in 216 Gazdrubal set out to penetrate Hannibal with reinforcements and reached Iberus, he was completely defeated by the Scipios. Thus, for several years there was no thought of sending aid from Spain. As a result, Hannibal's activities in Italy lost much of their significance and were limited in 215 to the capture of the insignificant city of Casilina, whose garrison, consisting of barely a thousand people, after courageous resistance, was forced to surrender by famine. The deprivation and need in this city reached an incredible degree. They removed the skin from the shields, boiled it and prepared food from it. To stave off the pangs of hunger, they ate mice and roots; many of the defenders, to put an end to the suffering, threw themselves from the city walls or deliberately exposed themselves as targets for enemy arrows. The commander of the Roman cavalry, Gracchus, who was standing not far from the city, had the idea of ​​sending barrels of bread down the Volturnus River so that the besieged would catch these barrels. However, this trick was discovered, and thus there was no choice but to surrender.

Meanwhile, the Romans fully recovered from their defeats and assembled significant new military forces. 18 legions and a fleet of 150 ships were assembled. The consuls of 214, Fabius and Marcellus, were placed at the head of these military forces. But not one of them dared to engage Hannibal in battle in the open field. They were content with the fact that they were able to repel his attacks on Naples, Tarentum, Puteoli and reconquer Casilene. Meanwhile, a third one joined the theaters of military operations in Italy and Spain. Immediately after the death of Hiero, a coup took place in Sicily. Hieron's grandson, Hieronymus, a 15-year-old youth, prompted by his advisers Andranador and Zoiplos, immediately began relations with the Carthaginians. Although he was killed in 214, his death served as a signal for bloody factions among the parties. The Republican Party initially gained the upper hand, but tarnished its victory with the murder of the entire Hiero family. The Carthaginians supported the anti-Roman party, whose leaders were Hippocrates and Epicydes, and thus the city found itself in the power of a mob hostile to Rome. Upon receiving news of these events, Marcellus landed on the island, and Appius Claudius appeared with a fleet in front of Syracuse. The siege of the unusually fortified and abundantly supplied city continued for two years. Its tenacious defense is mainly attributed to the genius of the mathematician and engineer Archimedes. He not only invented throwing machines (ballistas) of extraordinary force, but also “iron hands,” that is, lifting machines in the form of hands with hooks that grabbed, lifted into the air and from there threw Roman ships into the sea. But his use of incendiary mirrors, with which he allegedly set fire to ships, is not confirmed.

When, finally, the city, having gone through all the horrors of internal unrest and unrest, fell in 212, the victors, with the mercilessness characteristic of the Romans, subjected it to complete plunder. At the same time, the great Archimedes also died. According to legend, one Roman soldier, looking for prey, ran into Archimedes' room while he was drawing figures on the sand that covered the floor. “Don’t touch my circles!” - Archimedes shouted and immediately fell, pierced by a sword.

Archimedes

The works of art found in Syracuse were transported in large numbers to Rome. This rule became a custom and from that time on was observed by the victors in all subsequent wars. Rome, with its surrounding country houses, was so crowded with all kinds of exemplary works that it seemed like the birthplace of the arts, which in reality it never was.

The fall of Syracuse led two years later to the fall of Agrigentum, which the Carthaginians stubbornly held on to until 210. Thus, the campaign in Sicily ended in favor of the Romans. On the contrary, in Spain misfortune followed misfortune. The Scipios, left without sufficient reinforcements, were forced to accept Spanish mercenaries into their service. These unreliable troops fled when Gazdrubal, who had just defeated the Numidian king Syphax, approached. Gazdrubal attacked both brothers in turn and, taking advantage of the superiority of his forces, defeated them one by one. Both Scipios died fighting at the head of their troops. Only one small detachment, led by the horseman L. Marcius, managed to break through. Almost all of Spain was thus lost to the Romans.

Things went no better for the Romans in 212 in Lower Italy, where Tarentum fell into the hands of Hannibal. Having entered into an agreement with Nikon and Philomenes, the leaders of a party hostile to the Romans, Hannibal unexpectedly attacked the city by surprise, and Nikon and Philomenes opened the city gates for him. Only the Roman garrison in the city fortress remained undefeated. Of the large cities, Metapontus, Thurii and Heraclea followed the example of Tarentum. Only Rhegium and Naples remained with the Romans.

In order to prevent further defection of the allies, the Romans considered it necessary to set an example of what such a defection could lead to. For this they chose Capua. When the Capuans saw that the Romans were approaching their city, they hastily sent for help to Hannibal, who was standing at that time near Tarentum. First, Hannibal sent the talented commander Hanno, who was under his command, to transport provisions to the city of Capua. But due to the slowness of the Capuans, who missed the opportunity to stock up on transportation means in time to transport the food supplies stored in Beneventa, consul Fulvius managed to capture the entire transport. However, Hannibal subsequently managed to reward himself for this loss. When he personally appeared in front of Capua, both consuls, Fulvius and Appius Claudius, hastily retreated back. This time Capua was saved. Hannibal then went first to Lucania and defeated 8,000 Roman slaves there, who were under the command of the centurion M. Centenius, and then to Apulia, where at Herdonea he completely destroyed two Roman legions commanded by the praetor Fulvius. Despite all this, the Romans did not abandon their plan to conquer Capua. Hannibal had barely retreated when both consuls and praetor Claudius Nero appeared. They began to act on three sides against the city, surrounding it with double ramparts and ditches in order to force it to surrender by starvation. This time, Hannibal's eagerly awaited help did not appear for a long time. Having made futile attempts to take by storm the fortified castles of Tarentum and Brundisium, Hannibal led his troops to winter quarters. Here one Numidian, who made his way through the siege line, caught up with him and brought him a request from the Capuans for the fastest possible help. Hannibal set out with lightly armed infantry and 33 elephants on a forced march to the aid of Capua. But his attempt to liberate Capua was defeated by the superior forces of the Romans, whose army consisted of at least 60,000 people. Then Hannibal decided on a brave undertaking. He marched directly towards Rome in the hope of diverting a significant part of the siege troops from Capua with this maneuver and thus freeing that city from the blockade. Hannibal ordered the merciless devastation of the areas he traversed. Between Tusculum and Tibur he reached the Anio River, crossed it and camped in sight of the eternal city. A cry of horror was heard: “Hannibal is at the gate.” This cry for a long time served as a means for Roman mothers to force their children to remain silent. Women, screaming and sobbing, hurried to the temples to beg the gods to save them from a ruthless enemy. Nevertheless, the Senate decided to call up only a small part of the army that was besieging Capua. Fulvius immediately left the camp with 6,000 men and hurried along the Appian Way to Rome, where he arrived almost simultaneously with Hannibal, who was greatly delayed on his way by the devastation of the surrounding lands. There were already two newly formed legions here. Thus, there was nothing to think about a surprise attack on Rome. Although Hannibal tried to force a battle in front of the city gates, the Romans did not accept the challenge and did not allow themselves to be lured out of their strong position. The horror of his name and the fear of his military genius have not yet disappeared among them. A few days later, Hannibal set out on his return journey, hoping to reappear in front of Capua by a roundabout route through the regions of the Sabines, Marsians and Peligni. The Roman consuls followed him. Then he suddenly turned back, attacked the Romans at night, took their camp by storm, defeated them completely and put them to flight. But Capua still remained in a state of siege, and its liberation turned out to be impossible.

Irritated by the failure of his bold plan, Hannibal left the Capuans to their fate. Those of them who relied on the generosity of Rome were cruelly deceived. When the city gates finally had to be opened, 53 senators were taken in chains to Kales and Tean, there they were subjected to corporal punishment and executed. About 30 senators, in order to avoid revenge from the Romans, committed suicide. They gathered at the house of Bibi Birria for a farewell feast, after which they poisoned themselves. Three hundred noble men, including several people from small neighboring ones. the cities of Atella and Calatia were taken to Rome, where they starved to death in prison. The rest of the rebel population, with their wives and children, were sold into slavery. The less guilty lost their land and were forced to move to other places. Houses and city walls were spared, but the independent self-government of the Capuan city community was destroyed, and the administration of the city was entrusted to the Roman prefect. A whole stream of Roman workers and freedmen rushed into the deserted city. The fall of Capua in 211 began a decisive change in the history of Hannibal's wars. From this time on, the Romans began to gain visible superiority. The first important consequence of the victory in the Campaign was the opportunity to have troops, which were sent to Spain. Since the defeat of the Scipios, it was completely lost and provided the enemy with the opportunity to launch a second attack on Italy. A reinforcement of 11,000 men was sent to Spain under the command of 27-year-old P. Cornelius Scipio (210). This was the son of that Scipio who fought so unhappily at the Ticinus River. The noble features of Cornelius Scipio revealed him as an exalted hero, long wavy hair fell in curls over his shoulders, the inspiration of a genius sparkled in his eyes, his gait and all movements showed greatness and nobility. He attracted all hearts and was the favorite of both the people and Fortune.

Hannibal statue

The refined Hellenic education of Cornelius Scipio was in complete agreement with his feelings as a true Roman citizen. Sincere admiration for everything beautiful and great was combined in him with a prudent, practical mind. He was an extraordinary strategist and at the same time a skilled diplomat. Far from hatred and envy, perhaps too lenient towards the shortcomings of others, deeply religious, Cornelius Scipio had a truly noble, sublime character, although, as Mommsen says, perhaps he did not belong to those few individuals who (like Alexander the Great and Caesar) with their iron will forced the world to follow a new path and determined the direction of people's creative activity for entire centuries to come, or, like Hannibal or Napoleon, having captured the destinies of mankind for entire years, they controlled it until they themselves fell under the blows of fate. The Carthaginian commanders, both Hasdrubal and Mago, in a completely incomprehensible way, provided a garrison of only 1,000 people under the command of Hannan with the protection of a strategically important point - the harbor of New Carthage, in which their warehouses, arsenals, and workshops were located. Scipio learned about such a weak defense. In the deepest secrecy, he made the necessary preparations and in the spring of 209, with an army of about 25,000 infantry and 2,500 horsemen, he set out on a campaign from Tarracina. The fleet of 35 ships was commanded by Scipio's proven friend Laelius. The city was surrounded from sea and land. Thanks to the instructions of the fishermen, the weakly defended side of the city was opened, the walls were occupied and the gates were opened from the inside. The booty, which consisted of all kinds of military supplies, weapons, heavy missile weapons (catapults and ballistas), ships and ship stores, was very significant. At the same time, hostages given by the Spanish tribes to the Carthaginians were also captured. Scipio released them on the condition that, upon returning to their homeland, they would convince their compatriots to take the side of the Romans.

d) Gazdrubal on the Seine. Reconquest of Tarentum. Death of Marcellus.

The circle in which Hannibal could operate became tighter and tighter. The Italian allies abandoned him one by one. Philip of Macedon, with whom he had entered into an alliance back in 25, no longer seemed to the Romans a dangerous enemy. The Romans held it with small legions. In addition, they turned the cities of the Achaean League against him so much that it was just time for Philip to defend his own interests. As a result, Philip could not take advantage of the opportunity to attack Italy after Hannibal’s conquest of Tarentum in 212, which could have served as a landing site for his elite Macedonian troops. Hannibal's army was extremely constrained. Although Hannibal himself continued to remain invincible and invulnerable, the time came when he eagerly awaited the arrival of his brother Hasdrubal, who was supposed to bring new troops to him from Spain.

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First Punic War (264–241). The expansion of the borders of Rome and its access to Sicily led to an aggravation of contradictions with the Carthaginian power (Punians - the second name of the Carthaginians), which, being the heir of the Phoenicians, was very powerful and had great trade connections. Until the beginning of the 3rd century. Rome fought wars on its territory - Carthage also had its own problems, so its first clash with Rome occurred when Rome began to lay claim to hegemony in the Mediterranean, trying to push its borders beyond Italy. The slightest reason was enough for a clash between two states.

At the request of Messana (a city in Sicily) in 264, Rome intervened in its internal war with Syracuse and captured not only Syracuse, but also Messana itself. The west of the island was occupied by Carthage, which created fortified bases in the cities of Lilybaeum, Panormus and Drepana. The Romans advanced to the Carthaginian cities and besieged them, but at sea they were unable to compete with the new enemy, who defeated the Roman fleet in the first naval battle. In Rome, the same situation arose as under Themistocles during the Greco-Persian wars, when the need arose to create a powerful military squadron, which was immediately built. In 260, at Milae, the Romans inflicted the first major defeat on Carthage at sea.

Inspired by the victory, the Romans transferred hostilities directly to North Africa and in 256 besieged Carthage, which was ready to surrender, but Rome was not satisfied with the peace terms proposed by the besieged. The Punes began to defend themselves to the last, and the Romans, closer than ever to victory, were defeated. The fleet that rushed to their aid was lost in a storm, and the defeat turned out to be worse than ever.

Peace was concluded in 241. Carthage liberated Sicily, paid a huge indemnity (almost 80 tons of silver) and handed over Roman prisoners. Thus ended the first Punic War, reflecting an approximate equality of forces, since for almost twenty years both powers fought without a definite advantage on one side or the other.


Second Punic War (218–201). Revanchist sentiments were strong in Carthage, ideas arose for the forcible return of the territories conquered by Rome, which led to the second Punic War (218–201), the most terrible for Rome, which for the first time found itself on the brink of destruction. Carthage relied on an offensive war, moving troops to Rome through the Iberian Peninsula.

In 219, the Carthaginians captured Saguntum (modern Sagunto), which was a Roman ally on the eastern coast of Spain, which was almost completely occupied by the Punics, which served as the reason for a new war. The brilliant military leader Hannibal became the head of the Carthaginian troops. The trek started from Spain. Hannibal, with elephants and a huge army, made a heroic transition through the Alps, losing almost all the elephants and three-quarters of the army in the mountains. Nevertheless, he invaded Italy and inflicted a series of defeats on the Romans in 218 (at the Ticinus and Trebia rivers) and in 217 (an ambush at Lake Trasimene). Hannibal bypassed Rome and moved further south. The Romans avoided major battles and wore down their enemies with small skirmishes.

The decisive battle took place near the city of Cannes in 216, it was included in all textbooks of military art. Hannibal, with much smaller forces, defeated the Roman army, led by two warring consuls: a plebeian and a patrician. Hannibal placed weak units in the center of his army, and concentrated his main forces on the flanks, lining up the army in the form of an arc, with the curved side towards the Romans. When the Romans struck the center and broke through it, the flanks closed and the attackers were “in the bag”, after which the beating of the Roman soldiers began. Neither before nor after 216 did Rome suffer defeats equal to this.

It is not clear why Hannibal did not immediately march on Rome, since after the defeat at Cannae all the necessary conditions for this arose. If Hannibal, without wasting time, moved towards the capital, he would have every chance of capturing it. Obviously, the Carthaginians relied on the collapse of the Roman-Italian alliance, which had stood the test of war, since most of the Italian cities did not go over to Hannibal’s side, and the anti-Roman coalition did not take shape.

In 211, a turning point came in the war. The Romans took the main stronghold of the Carthaginians in Italy, the city of Capua, and Hannibal, who had not suffered a single major defeat in Italy, found himself in complete isolation, abandoned even by Carthage, who did not send help. The final collapse came after the promotion of a personality equal to Hannibal in terms of military talent. From 210 Publius Cornelius Scipio the Younger became the head of the Roman troops. He quite successfully fought with the Carthaginians in Spain and advocated for the transfer of hostilities to North Africa, wanting to expel Hannibal from Italy. After Scipio's landing in Africa in 204, Hannibal was hastily recalled to his homeland. At Zama in 202, Scipio used the same technique as Hannibal at Cannae - this time the Carthaginian army was drawn into the bag. It was defeated, and Hannibal fled. The next year, 201, Carthage capitulated. Under the new peace terms, he was deprived of his overseas possessions, did not have the right to maintain a navy, and had to pay an indemnity for fifty years. He retained only a small territory in Africa.

Third Punic War (149–146). Carthage managed to recover from the defeat and began to trade extensively. Rome was wary of his new strengthening in the Western Mediterranean. The prominent senator Marcus Porcius Cato expressed these fears vividly: “Carthage must be destroyed.” Rome issued a strict ultimatum to Carthage, all points of which were satisfied, with the exception of the clearly impossible one: moving the city inland. The Romans sent an army to North Africa, which, after a long siege, took Carthage in 146. The city was razed to the ground, and the place where it was located was plowed up. From now on, the Roman province of Africa was created here, the lands of which became the state property of Rome.

From the beginning of the 2nd century, by the time the Punic Wars ended, Rome had become the only major power in the Mediterranean. Until the middle of the 2nd century. he still fought with Macedonia and the Seleucid kingdom, but, according to the Greek historian Polybius, a contemporary of the events, from that time the worldwide dominion of Rome began.

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Against Carthage occupy a significant place in the history of the Ancient World. They influenced the further development of the Mediterranean and all of Europe. Second 218-201 BC e. - the brightest of the three that took place. It is also called the Hannibal War, or the war against Hannibal. In addition to Rome and Carthage, Numidia, Pergamum, the Aetolian League, Syracuse, the Achaean League and Macedonia took part in this confrontation.

Background

In 242 BC. e. A peace treaty was signed, ending the First Punic War. As a result of this agreement, Carthage lost control of the income from the possession of Sicily, and the almost monopoly trade of the Carthaginians in the Western Mediterranean was greatly undermined by Rome. As a result, Carthage was in a difficult economic situation, and its ruling dynasty of the Barcids was at a political disadvantage - the opposition intensified. Even then it was clear that the Second Punic War would soon take place between Rome and Carthage with the aim of destroying one of them, since there was no place for two major powers in the Mediterranean.

Rivalry for Spain

Hamilcar, commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian army, launched campaigns to conquer the territories of Spain. Firstly, it was very rich in natural resources, and secondly, it was possible to get to Italy quite quickly from Spain. Hamilcar, together with his son-in-law Hasdrubal, was active in expanding the borders of Carthage for almost 10 years, until he was killed during the siege of Helica. His comrade-in-arms, Hasdrubal, became a victim of the Iberian barbarian in New Carthage, founded by him.

New Carthage instantly became the center of all Western Mediterranean trade, as well as the administrative center of the Punic possessions. Thus, Carthage not only compensated for its losses as a result of the First War with Rome, but it also gained new markets, and the silver mines of Spain enriched the Barkids and deprived their political opponents of any support. Second Punic War 218-201 BC e. was only a matter of time.

Rome's worries

Roman politicians and military leaders were very concerned about the growing power of Carthage. Rome understood that now it was not too late to stop the Poons, but after some time it would be difficult. Therefore, the Romans began to look for a reason to start a war. During the lifetime of Hannibal's father, Hamilcar, a border was drawn between Carthage and Rome in Spain along the Iber River.

Rome enters into an alliance with Sogunt. It was clearly directed against Carthage, and specifically to stop its advance further north. The beginning of the Second Punic War was approaching, Rome did not need such a strong neighbor, but it also could not openly act as an aggressor, so an alliance was concluded with Sogunt. It is clear that Rome did not intend to defend its ally, but Carthage’s attack on it provided a pretext for starting a war.

Hannibal of the Barkids dynasty

Hannibal was destined to become a symbol of the struggle against Roman rule in the Mediterranean basin; he succeeded in what no one had dared to do before him. He was a talented commander and military leader; his soldiers respected him not for his high origins, but for his personal merits and leadership qualities.

From an early age, Father Hamilcar took his son on hikes. All his adult life he was in military camps, where from childhood he looked death in the face. Dozens, hundreds, if not thousands of people were killed before his eyes. He's already used to it. Constant training turned Hannibal into a skilled fighter, and his study of military affairs turned him into a brilliant commander. Meanwhile, Hamilcar did everything in order to get closer to the Hellenistic world, so he taught the Greek alphabet to his son and accustomed him to the culture of the Greeks. The father understood that Rome could not be dealt with without allies, and he taught his sons to their culture, and also encouraged an alliance. Hannibal was to play an important role in this process. He had been planning the Second Punic War for many years. And after the death of his father, he swore that he would destroy Rome.

Causes of the war

There are three main reasons that led to the outbreak of the second war between Rome and Carthage:

1. Humiliating consequences for Carthage under the terms of the peace treaty that ended the First Punic War.

2. The rapid growth of the territories of Carthage, as well as its enrichment due to the richest possessions in Spain, which resulted in the strengthening of its military power.

3. The siege and capture of Soguntum, allied with Rome, by Carthage, which became the official reason that resulted in the Second Punic War. Its reasons were more formal than real, and yet they led to one of the largest confrontations in the entire history of the Ancient World.

Beginning of the war

After the death of Hamilcar and the assassination of Hasdrubal, Hannibal was elected commander in chief. Then he had just turned 25 years old, he was full of strength and determination to destroy Rome. In addition, he had a fairly good set of knowledge in the field of military affairs and, of course, leadership qualities.

Hannibal did not hide from anyone that he wanted to attack Sogunt, whose ally was Rome, and thereby involve the latter in the war. However, Hannibal did not attack first. He had Soguntus attack the Iberian tribes that were under the rule of Carthage, and only after that he moved his forces against the “aggressor”. Hannibal rightly counted on the fact that Rome would not provide military assistance to Sogunt, since he himself fought against the Gauls and Illyrian pirates. The siege of Sogunt lasted 7 months, after which the fortress was taken. Rome never provided military assistance to its ally. After the capture of Sogunt, Rome sent an embassy to Carthage, which declared war. The Second Punic War has begun!

Hostilities

The war lasted more than 15 years. During this time, military clashes either between Rome and Carthage, or between their allies, almost never ceased. Tens of thousands of people died. Over the years, the advantage changed hands: if in the initial period of the war luck was on Hannibal’s side, then after some time the Romans became more active, inflicting a number of major defeats on the Poons in Iberia and North Africa. At the same time, Hannibal remained in Italy. Hannibal himself achieved great results, making the entire local population tremble before his name.

The Second Punic War showed that Hannibal had no equal in open battle. This is evidenced by the battles at the Ticinus and Trebbia rivers, at Lake Trasimene and, of course, the legendary battles that are sewn into military history like a red thread.

The fighting took place on several fronts: in Italy, Spain, Sicily, North Africa and Macedonia, but the “engine” of Carthage and its allies was Hannibal’s army and himself. Therefore, Rome set itself the goal of “bleeding” it, blocking the routes of provisions, weapons and reinforcements for waging war in Italy. Rome succeeded when he realized that Hannibal first needed to be exhausted without general battles, and then finished off. This plan was successful, but before it, Rome suffered one defeat after another, especially the Battle of Cannae. In this battle, Carthage had 50,000 soldiers, Rome - 90,000. The advantage was almost twofold, but even with such a numerical superiority, Rome failed to win. During the battle, 70,000 Roman soldiers were killed and 16,000 were captured, while Hannibal lost only 6,000 men.

There are a number of reasons that led to the victory of Rome. Firstly, this is the fact that the army of Carthage consisted mainly of mercenaries, who did not care at all who they were fighting for - they received payment for it. The mercenaries did not have any patriotic feelings, unlike the Romans, who defended their homeland.

Secondly, the Carthaginians themselves, located in Africa, often did not understand why they needed this war. Within the country, the Barkids again formed a serious opposition that opposed the war with Rome. Even after the Battle of Cannae, the oligarchs of Carthage halfheartedly sent small reinforcements to Hannibal, although this help could have been much more significant, and then the outcome of the war would have been completely different. The whole point is that they feared the strengthening of Hannibal's power and the establishment of a dictatorship, which would be followed by the destruction of the oligarchy as a social class.

Thirdly, the rebellions and betrayals that awaited Carthage at every turn, and the lack of real help from its ally, Macedonia.

Fourthly, this is, of course, the genius of the Roman military school, which acquired a wealth of experience during the war. At the same time, this war became a difficult test for Rome, putting it on the brink of survival. The reasons for the defeat of Carthage in the Second Punic War can still be listed, but they will all stem from these 4 main ones, which led to the defeat of one of the most powerful armies of the Ancient World.

Difference between the Second and First Punic Wars

The two wars were completely different, although they have a similar name. The first was aggressive on both sides, it developed as a result of the rivalry between Rome and Carthage for the possession of the rich island of Sicily. The second was aggressive only from the side of Carthage, but carried out a liberation mission.

The result in both the First and Second Wars was the victory of Rome, a huge indemnity imposed on Carthage, and the establishment of borders. After the end of the Second Punic War, the causes, consequences and historical significance of which are difficult to overestimate, Carthage was generally prohibited from having a fleet. He lost all his overseas possessions and was subjected to an exorbitant tax for 50 years. In addition, he could not start wars without the consent of Rome.

The Second Punic War could have changed the course of history if the commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian forces, Hannibal, had greater support within the country. He could have defeated Rome. Moreover, everything was heading towards this; as a result of the Battle of Cannae, Rome did not have a large army capable of resisting Carthage, but Hannibal, with the available forces, would not have been able to capture a well-fortified Rome. He was waiting for support from Africa and the uprising of Italian cities against Rome, but he never received either the first or the second...

Rome and Carthage

Topic 8: Carthage. First Punic War (264–241 BC). Second Punic War (218–201 BC). Third Punic War (149–146 BC). Historical significance of the Punic Wars.

Carthage

Carthage was founded in 814 BC. e. settlers from the Phoenician city of Tire in the fertile land of northern Africa. The Phoenicians were famous as brave sailors and merchants. Carthage was one of the richest and most powerful cities. In the 3rd century BC. e. it was the most powerful power in the western Mediterranean.

By the seventies of the 3rd century BC. e. Rome already felt strong enough to measure its strength with the great Carthage, which looked down on Rome. Indeed, the Carthaginians had a strong fleet, which could not be said about the Romans. On land, their strengths turned out to be equal. Carthage had a well-trained mercenary army. The Roman militia consisted of citizens for whom the interests of the city were their own.

The wars between Rome and Carthage were called Punic, because the Romans called the Carthaginians Punes (Punians).

First Punic War (264–241 BC)

In 264 BC. e. Because of the city of Syracuse, the long and grueling First Punic War began. Rome laid claim to the role of a great power. He entered the world political arena.

Under pressure from the popular assembly, the Roman Senate declared war on Carthage. The main unit of the Roman army at that time was the legion. During the Punic Wars, it consisted of 3,000 heavily armed and 1,200 lightly armed warriors without armor. Heavily armed warriors were divided into hastati , principles And triarii . 1200 hastati are the youngest warriors who did not yet have a family. They formed the first echelon of the legion and took the main blow of the enemy. 1200 principles - middle-aged fathers of families - formed the second echelon, and 600 veteran triarii - the third. The smallest tactical unit of the legion was century . The two centuries united into maniple .

The bulk of the Carthaginian army consisted of soldiers fielded by Carthage's dependent African territories, allied Numidia, and also hired in Greece, Gaul, the Iberian Peninsula, Sicily and Italy. All of them, in essence, were professional mercenaries who lived on their salaries and spoils of war. If there was no money in the Carthaginian treasury, then the mercenaries could engage in robbery or rebel. In terms of the quality of combat training, the army of Carthage was significantly superior to the army of Rome, but required much more funds for its maintenance and therefore was significantly inferior to its enemy in numbers.

Military operations took place mainly in Sicily and lasted 24 years.

At first things went well for Rome. The Romans tried to transform sea battles into land battles, because they did not like the sea and felt confident only in hand-to-hand combat. In 247, the talented commander Hamilcar Barca took command of the Carthaginian troops in Sicily. Taking advantage of his dominance at sea, he began to attack the Italian coast and capture prisoners from among the inhabitants of cities allied with Rome, in order to then exchange them for Carthaginian prisoners in the hands of the Romans. Only in 242, having captured a Carthaginian ship, in its image the Romans built themselves a small fleet of 200 ships and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Carthaginian fleet in the battle of the Egotic Islands. The Carthaginians lost 120 ships. After this, peace was signed in 241. According to the peace treaty, Sicily was ceded to Rome.

The Romans conducted the First Punic War poorly. They won rather thanks to the mistakes of the Carthaginians. The gaps were filled with the energy and firmness of the Romans. The victory was not final. The peace could not last.

Second Punic War (218–201 BC)

Hamilcar Barca, the commander-in-chief of the army of Carthage, raised his son Hannibal to hate Rome. The boy grew up and became an excellent soldier. In the person of Hannibal, Carthage received a brilliant leader. In 219 BC. e. at the age of 28 he was proclaimed commander-in-chief.

The reason for the start of a new war was Hannibal’s siege of the city of Sagunta, allied to Rome, on the southern coast of the Iberian Peninsula. Carthage refused to lift the siege. The Romans planned to land in Africa, but their plans were destroyed by Hannibal, who made an unprecedented transition through Gaul and the seemingly impregnable Alps. The Carthaginian army unexpectedly found itself on Italian territory. Advancing towards Rome through Italy, Hannibal hoped to form alliances with local tribes against Rome, but he failed. Most tribes remained loyal to Rome. The journey through Italy for the Carthaginians was very difficult and tiring: the army suffered huge losses.

In the summer of 216 BC. e. The Carthaginians captured the Romans' food warehouse in a fortification near the city of Cannae. Hannibal camped here, hoping that the enemy would try to recapture the warehouse. The Roman legions, indeed, moved towards Cannes and stopped 2 km from the city. The Roman commander Varro led his troops into the field and managed to repel the attack of the Carthaginians. The next day Paul took command of the Roman troops. He stationed two-thirds of the army on the left bank of the Aufid River, and one-third on the right bank. Hannibal deployed his entire army against the main forces of the Romans. The Carthaginian commander, according to the historian Polybius, addressed the troops with a short speech: “With victory in this battle, you will immediately become masters of the whole of Italy; This one battle will put an end to your present labors, and you will be the owners of all the wealth of the Romans, you will become lords and lords of the whole earth. That’s why there’s no need for more words—we need action.” Hannibal threw 2 thousand Numidian cavalry against the 4 thousand cavalry of the Roman allies, but concentrated 8 thousand cavalry units against the 2 thousand Roman cavalry. The Carthaginian cavalry scattered the Roman horsemen, and then struck the cavalry of the Roman allies from the rear. The Roman infantry pushed back the mercenary Gauls in the center and came under attack from the two strongest Libyan wings. The Roman legions found themselves surrounded. The end of the battle was disastrous for the Romans.

Hannibal never managed to take Rome. There were reasons for this. Firstly, the Carthaginian government did not treat Hannibal personally very well; secondly, the Carthaginians fought simultaneously in different provinces (there were battles, for example, in Sicily), and Hannibal could not count on serious support from his state.

Near the small town of Zama in 202 BC. e. the punas suffered a crushing defeat. Hannibal's army fled. According to Polybius, the Punic army in the Battle of Zama lost 20 thousand killed and 10 thousand prisoners, and the Romans lost 2 thousand killed. The figures for Carthaginian losses seem greatly exaggerated, but the outcome of the battle favorable to the Romans is beyond doubt.

In 201, Carthage was forced to agree to humiliating peace terms. The entire military fleet of 500 ships had to be handed over to the Romans. Of all the possessions of the Punics, only a small territory adjacent to Carthage remained. Now the city had no right to either wage war or make peace without the permission of Rome and had to pay an indemnity of 10 thousand talents for 50 years. As a result of the Second Punic War, the Roman Republic won hegemony in the Mediterranean basin for six hundred years. The defeat of Carthage was predetermined by the inequality of human resources. The Libyans, Numidians, Gauls and Iberians who served in the Punic army were significantly outnumbered by the Italics. The military genius of the winner at Cannae was powerless, as was the superiority of the Carthaginian professionals over the Roman militia. Carthage ceased to be a great power and became completely dependent on Rome.

Third Punic War (149–146 BC)

Under the terms of the peace treaty drawn up after the end of the Second Punic War, the Romans had the right to intervene in all political affairs of Carthage. Marcus Porcius Cato the Elder was placed at the head of one of Rome's commissions to Africa. Seeing the countless riches of the Poons, Cato declared that he would not be able to sleep peacefully until Carthage was completely destroyed. The Roman army quickly prepared for war. The Romans made cruel demands to the Poons: to hand over 300 noble hostages and all weapons. The Carthaginians hesitated, but still complied with the demands. However, the Roman consul Lucius Caesarinus stated that Carthage should be razed to the ground, and a new settlement should be founded no closer than 14 miles from the sea. Then the desperate determination of which only the Semites were capable flared up in the Carthaginians. It was decided to resist to the last extreme.

The Roman army stood at the walls of Carthage for almost two years. Not only were no positive results achieved, but the spirit of the Carthaginians only increased. In 147 BC. e. The leadership of the Romans was entrusted to Scipio Aemilianus, the grandson of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, the hero of the Second Punic War. Scipio first of all cleared the army of the mass of harmful rabble, restored discipline and vigorously waged the siege. Scipio blockaded the city from land and sea, built a dam and blocked access to the harbor, through which the besieged received everything they needed. The Carthaginians dug a wide canal, and their fleet unexpectedly went to sea.

In the spring of 146 BC. e. The Romans took Carthage by storm. Having burst into the city, they experienced fierce resistance for another 6 days. Driven to extremes, the Carthaginians set fire to the temple in which they locked themselves in order to die in the flames, and not at the hands of the enemy. The former possessions of Carthage were turned into a Roman province called Africa. It was subsequently governed by governors. The population received freedom, but was subject to taxes in favor of Rome. Outlying provinces were given different rights depending on their behavior during the war. The Roman rich flocked to the new province and began to collect profits that had previously gone into the coffers of Carthaginian merchants.

The Third Punic War did not bring glory to Rome. If in the first two wars equal opponents fought, then in the third - omnipotent Rome dealt with defenseless Carthage.

Historical significance of the Punic Wars

It was Rome that initiated the wars with Carthage, eager to seize as much land as possible, and such a major power as Carthage was a “tidbit” for the Romans. The victory was very difficult for Rome. In total, the wars lasted about 120 years. The Romans had talented generals. They were able to create a good navy, which Rome did not have at all before the start of the First Punic War. After three exhausting and bloody Punic Wars, Rome captured Carthage. The surviving inhabitants were sold into slavery, and the city itself was razed to the ground, and the place on which it stood was cursed. The territories belonging to Carthage were turned into Roman provinces. Rome became the sole and sovereign master of the Western Mediterranean and confidently ruled its eastern part.

Questions and tasks for self-test on topic 8.

1. Who and when was Carthage founded?

2. For what reason did the war begin between Rome and Carthage?

3. Describe the First Punic War.

4. Describe the Second Punic War.

5. Describe the Third Punic War.

6. What is the historical significance of the Punic Wars?


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